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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When a party to a lawsuit in federal court argues that a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule” or “Rule”) governs an issue 
before the court, and the opposing party argues that state law governs 
the issue, the court has a Rules Enabling Act (“Enabling Act” or “Act”) 
problem.2  To resolve it, the court must determine whether the Federal 
 
 1  See DANIEL L. GROOVER & CECIL C. CONNER, JR., SKELETONS FROM THE OPERA 
CLOSET 49–75 (1994) (listing the world’s worst operas).  Not all operas involving the 
Supreme Court are bad.  See Emily Langer, Derrick Wang Discusses “Scalia/Ginsburg,” His 
Opera About the Supreme Court Justices, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/derrick-wang-discusses-
scaliaginsburg-his-opera-about-the-supreme-court-justices/2013/10/03/7ec92c2a-
2624-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html (discussing Scalia/Ginsburg—”an operatic 
fantasy” in the style of The Magic Flute—with lyrics based on Justices Ginsburg and 
Scalia’s opposing views about constitutional interpretation).  
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  I am grateful to the 
UM Foundation for its generous financial support, and to participants in the 
University of Maryland School of Law Faculty Workshop for their very helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
 2  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in 
the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.”).  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 
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Rule is pertinent to the issue in dispute; if it is, whether the Rule is valid 
under the Enabling Act; and if it is, whether the Enabling Act itself is 
constitutional.3  Think of this as the PVC standard.4  If the answer to all 
three questions is yes, the court must apply the Federal Rule, for there 
can be no higher law. 
A Federal Rule is pertinent to an issue in dispute if, by its own 
terms, it provides a standard for deciding that issue.5  Rule 4 is 
pertinent to an issue of whether service of process is adequate, for 
example, because Rule 4, by its own terms, provides the federal 
standard for determining the adequacy of service.6  A Federal Rule is 
valid under the Enabling Act if it is a “rule[] of practice and 
procedure” and7 it does not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”8  The Enabling Act authorizes the creation of only procedural 
rules, and any attempt to use it to make substantive “rules of decision” 
would be invalid.9  Finally, the Enabling Act itself must be a proper 
 
2072 (2012).  There are esoteric versions of the Rules Enabling Act problem but the 
one involving a so-called direct collision between a Federal Rule and state law is the 
prototype.  There can be an Enabling Act problem without such a “direct collision,” 
see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1998), but there is no such 
scenario in the case law, and the possibility is more theoretical than real.  See Robert J. 
Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & Casebook Law 
Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 508–12 (2005) [hereinafter Condlin, Formstone] 
(describing the nature of a Rules Enabling Act problem). 
 3  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965) (“We conclude that . . .  Rule 
4 (d)(1), designed to control service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded 
the congressional mandate in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional 
bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court 
should have measured the adequacy of service.”).   
 4  Pertinence + Validity + Constitutionality = PVC.  If the Erie/Hanna doctrine is a 
“Formstone of our federalism,” see Condlin, Formstone, supra note 2, at 475 n.1, then 
Enabling Act jurisprudence is federalism’s polyvinyl chloride. 
 5  See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980).  The Court often 
expresses the point as the Rule being “sufficiently broad” to “govern” or “control” the 
resolution of the issue.  See id. 
 6  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.  The Federal Rules do not always govern when they seem 
to.  For example, in Walker, the Court held that Rule 3 does not govern the issue of 
when a lawsuit is commenced for state statute of limitations purposes, notwithstanding 
that Rule 3, by its own terms, regulates the “commencement” of a lawsuit.  Statutes of 
limitations are substantive, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945), 
and the Federal Rules cannot create substantive law.  See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–51, 
and the discussion in Condlin, Formstone, supra note 2, at 519–21.  Whether a federal 
court must apply state law in the absence of a pertinent Federal Rule is governed by 
the Rules of Decision Act, not the Enabling Act.  See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–70. 
 7  I highlight the conjunction because over the years the Supreme Court has taken 
different positions on the question of whether the Act articulates a one- or two-part 
standard.  See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
 8  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 9  Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted 
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts . . . but it has never 
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exercise of Congress’s legislative power under the Judiciary Article and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to authorize the 
creation of Federal Rules in the first instance.10  That issue, once 
decided (as it has been),11 remains an unstated premise of all Enabling 
Act analysis. 
Over the years, the validity part of the PVC standard has proven 
the most difficult part to understand and apply, and that is a little 
surprising.  The Enabling Act’s language is relatively clear, but even if 
it was not, one would expect seventy plus years of case law 
interpretation to have removed any lingering ambiguities and 
confusions.  The fact that the Supreme Court never has found a 
Federal Rule invalid also suggests that the Act’s validity standard is not 
that difficult to understand and apply.12  But agreeing on a definitive 
statement of the Enabling Act’s validity standard, as well as the proper 
method for determining the meaning of that standard, has proven 
elusive. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this interpretive 
thicket, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance 
Company,13 raised the hope that this longstanding problem finally 
would be resolved; but when the Shady Grove decision was announced 
it became clear that the lack of a resolution was the only thing that was 
final.  Justices Scalia14 and Ginsburg were the principal antagonists in 
Shady Grove, and the differences in their views were as pronounced as 
any in the long history of the debate over the Act.  Justice Scalia (with 
Justice Stevens’s help) carried the day on outcome in the case, but he 
was able to muster only three other votes for his particular 
interpretation of the Act; and now that Justice Scalia has died and 
Justice Stevens has retired, there may not be a majority on the Court 
for even that outcome.15  The Court’s failure to bring this longstanding 
 
essayed to declare the substantive state law . . . .).  
 10  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Judiciary Article); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 
(Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 11  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9–10. 
 12  The Court has found ways to take a Federal Rule out of the picture without 
invalidating it.  See infra note 102. 
 13  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 14  This Article was written before Justice Scalia’s recent death, but the view of the 
Enabling Act he expressed in Shady Grove is shared by other members of the Court 
and remains one of the two principal interpretations of the Act competing for 
dominance.  It makes sense to continue to refer to the view as his.  He was its most 
eloquent and forceful defender. 
 15  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits 
of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 911 (2011) (“With Stevens’s departure from 
the Court and replacement with Justice Elena Kagan, one can hardly be confident that 
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interpretive brouhaha to a conclusion has left lower courts free to 
parse the Enabling Act on their own, and this has resulted in the wide 
variety of views one would expect when federal judges are free to think 
for themselves.16  After all of these years, confusion and disagreement 
abound at both the highest and lowest levels, so much so in fact that 
the Enabling Act now effectively has been disabled as a rule of law.17  
The temptation to ask how this could have happened is irresistible. 
I will discuss the Enabling Act’s interpretive discontents in the 
following manner.  In Section II, I will describe the competing views in 
the debate over the Act’s meaning and the relatively small number of 
cases in which those views are defined and developed.  In Section III, 
I will explain how the Shady Grove decision clarifies the points of 
disagreement in the debate, but does not reconcile or resolve them.  
Finally, in Section IV, I will explain why the debate may never end, and 
why the Supreme Court is likely to oscillate indefinitely between the 
polar positions of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg (and their ancestors, 
heirs, and assigns), as if mired in an interminable Kipling-Marx debate 
grounded on incompatible premises and devoid of shared principles.18 
II.  THE RULES ENABLING ACT AND ITS INTERPRETIVE DISCONTENTS 
On its face, the Rules Enabling Act does not seem to be a 
confusing statute.  It says, in relevant part: 
 
 
Shady Grove would come out the same way were it reargued today.”).  
 16  Even when it is possible to predict when a federal court will apply a Federal 
Rule, it is difficult to know on what basis the court will make this decision, and thus 
difficult to know on what basis to argue the point.  Lawyers must make every possible 
argument as a consequence, and charge clients for all of them.  Disagreement over the 
Act’s meaning not only is confusing, it also is expensive. 
 17  See infra Section IV. 
 18  The Shady Grove case does not lack for academic commentary or advice on how 
to resolve the debate.  See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further 
Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939 
(2011); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010) [hereinafter Burbank & 
Wolff]; Kevin Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
987 (2011); Jack Friedenthal, Defining the Word “Maintain”; Context Counts, 44 AKRON L. 
REV. 1139 (2011); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2011); Allen Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041 (2011); Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal 
Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012); 
Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After 
Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131 (2011); Stempel, supra note 15; Catherine 
T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the 
Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181 (2011). 
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(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the 
United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.  All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of 
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.19 
Read literally, this language seems to articulate a two-part 
standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule.  To be valid, a 
Rule first must be a rule of “practice and procedure” (subsection a), 
and second, it must “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right” (subsection b).20  The terms “practice and procedure” and 
“substantive right” are not self-defining, of course, but each has a long 
history in law and one would expect that the Enabling Act’s use of 
them would have been made clear in the case law.  In real life, however, 
one would be disappointed.  The Supreme Court sometimes has 
interpreted the expression “rules of practice and procedure,” to 
include both substantive and procedural rules, and sometimes 
interpreted the expression “substantive rights” to refer to nothing at 
all.21  The decisions announcing these confusing and not always 
consistent interpretations continue to fuel the debate over the 
meaning of the Act.22  I will review the most important of these 
decisions and describe the difficulties they create for understanding 
the Act.23 
A.  Sibbach v. Wilson 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Enabling Act for the first 
time in 1941, in the celebrated case of Sibbach v. Wilson,24 and that 
decision continues to play a prominent role in Enabling Act 
jurisprudence to the present day.  In Sibbach, the Court was asked to 
determine (in effect) whether the defendant’s request to conduct a 
compulsory medical examination of the plaintiff was governed by 
 
 19  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).  
 20  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 21  Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-
Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 41 n.73 
(2008) [hereinafter Redish & Murashko].  
 22  See id. at 35–41 (describing three conceivable interpretations of the intersection 
of procedure and substance in the Enabling Act).  The Enabling Act also authorizes 
the creation of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Evidence, but my focus in 
this Article will be on the Civil Rules.  
 23  Justices on all sides of the debate cite to the same limited number of core cases 
to support their contradictory views.  The various opinions in Shady Grove discuss all of 
these cases. 
 24  Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
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Federal Rule 35, which authorized the examination,25 or a conflicting 
state law, which arguably26 prohibited it.  The plaintiff had filed a 
negligence action in the Northern District of Illinois seeking to recover 
for injuries suffered in Indiana, and her medical condition was an issue 
in the case.27  The defendant moved for an order requiring the plaintiff 
to submit to a medical examination and the district court granted the 
motion.28  The plaintiff refused to submit to the examination, however, 
arguing that it would invade her substantive right of bodily integrity 
under Illinois law.29  The district court held the plaintiff in contempt 
for violating its order, the plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the contempt order.30  The Supreme Court reversed the 
Seventh Circuit on grounds unrelated to the Rule 35 issue,31 but also 
held that Rule 35 was valid, and affirmed the district court’s order 
requiring the plaintiff to submit to the examination.32 
Writing for a five-person majority, Justice Stanley Roberts asked 
whether Rule 35 was “within the mandate of Congress to this Court [in 
the Enabling Act]” to create Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33  After 
finding two Conformity Act precedents not dispositive,34 the Court 
described itself as “thrown back . . . to the arguments drawn from the 
language of the [Enabling] Act.”35  In parsing that language it 
discussed the “practice and procedure” requirement now in subsection 
(a) of the Act and the “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right” prohibition now in subsection (b), as if they were a single, one-
 
 25  FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a) (“The court . . . may order a party whose mental or physical 
condition . . . is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination . . . .”).  
 26  I say “arguably,” not because the state law in question was unclear, but because 
it was not clear which state law applied.  Of the two possible candidates, only one 
prohibited the physical exam.  See infra note 29. 
 27  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6. 
 28  Id. 
 29  The plaintiff’s cause of action was governed by Indiana substantive law because 
her claim arose in Indiana, and Indiana law permitted a compulsory physical exam.  
To avoid this, the plaintiff argued that she had an “important and substantial” right 
under Illinois procedural rules not to be compelled to submit to such an exam, and 
that the federal court had to apply the Illinois procedural rule under the command of 
the Conformity Act.  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6–7, 10–11. 
 30  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 7. 
 31  The Court held that Rule 37 did not permit the use of the contempt sanction 
for a refusal to submit to a physical exam under Rule 35.  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 16. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 9. 
 34  The Enabling Act had replaced the Conformity Act seven years earlier.  See 
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10.  See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1176–77 (1982). 
 35  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13.  
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part standard.36  For a Rule to be valid, the Court said, in language that 
has carried down to the present day, “[t]he test must be whether a rule 
really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recognized by substantive law . . . .”37  If it does, the Rule is 
valid, and if it also is pertinent, the court must apply it.38 
The Court did not explain its use of the euphonious adverb 
“really,”39 and the word does not have an obvious meaning in an 
Enabling Act context.  For example, is a Rule with substantive and 
procedural dimensions “really” substantive, or “really” procedural?  Is 
a procedural purpose enough to make a Rule “really” procedural, or is 
a procedural effect required as well?  If a procedural purpose or effect 
is enough by itself, must that purpose or effect be the Rule’s principal 
purpose or effect, or is a secondary or incidental purpose or effect 
enough?  These questions, and others like them, arise inevitably when 
one tries to use the cryptic “really regulates procedure” phrase to 
determine the validity of a Federal Rule, but the Court said nothing in 
Sibbach about how to answer them. 
Had it been forced to consider the question, the Court probably 
would have agreed with later commentators and courts that a Rule 
need not be exclusively procedural to be valid under the Enabling Act 
(it is difficult to make a rule that is exclusively procedural).  It is 
enough that a Rule have some significant procedural dimension, or—
as Justice Harlan famously put it in a later case—that it is “rationally 
capable” of being classified as procedural.40  The Court seemed to 
agree that if a Rule had only an insubstantial or incidental effect on 
substantive rights it would not abridge those rights, and thus would not 
violate the second part of the Act’s standard.41  If it were otherwise, few 
Federal Rules would be valid since almost all procedural rules have 
 
 36  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10–15 (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates 
procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.”).  At the time of Sibbach, the two provisions were both in section 
(a) of the Enabling Act.  Section (b) of the Act at that time preserved the right to a 
jury trial in actions at law.  See Burbank, supra note 34, at 1108. 
 37  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.  
 38  See id. 
 39  See Neil Genzlinger, The ‘R’ Word: Really, Really Overused, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/arts/television/really-pops-up-
everywhere-on-television.html?_r=1 (recounting that the term “really” once referred 
to a “gap in the user’s knowledge” but has now been reduced to an “epidemic on 
scripted shows [due to] lazy writing”).  
 40  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
 41  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13–16 (describing how it was unnecessary to discuss Rule 
35’s effect on the state’s rights in question); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464–65.  
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some incidental effects on substantive law.42  To be valid under the Act, 
therefore, insofar as the Court explained it in Sibbach, a Federal Rule 
need only avoid creating a “rule of decision”—a rule for resolving the 
substantive merits of the legal claims in dispute.43  If it does this, as Rule 
35 does, the Rule is valid.44 
The Sibbach majority supported its reading of the Enabling Act 
with three arguments.  The first, what one might think of as an ex 
cathedra textualist claim,45 declared that the Act’s prohibition on 
abridging “substantive rights” was “confined to” (or “embraced”) only 
rights “protected and enforced in accordance with the adjective law of 
judicial procedure.”46  While no doubt true, this attempt at a definition 
was not very helpful.  It said, in effect, that substantive rights were rights 
enforced by procedural rights; but substantive and procedural rights 
are mutually exclusive categories by definition and describing one as 
not the other is question begging.  The Court needed to define the 
concept of substantive rights in positive terms for the expression to 
have meaning (a task subsequent commentators have shown is 
possible),47 and its failure to do so introduced a confusion into 
 
 42  See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464–65 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp., v. Murphree, 
326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946)). 
 43  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10–11. 
 44  See id. at 16.  Like Justice Potter Stewart recognized pornography, Justice 
Roberts seemed to believe that he knew a rule of practice and procedure when he saw 
it.  Most Justices do not talk that way anymore.  Cf. Bauer, supra note 18, at 974 (“[T]he 
[Shady Grove] plurality’s ‘test’ of ‘procedure’ was so imprecise that it reminds one of 
Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity—‘I know it when I see it.’”). 
 45  Think of ex cathedra textualism as a form of interpretation that, like the Catholic 
Church’s doctrine of infallibility, grounds the force of a pronouncement, interpretive 
or otherwise, on the authority of the speaker.  Ex Cathedra, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ex%20cathedra (defining ex cathedra); 
What Does the Term Ex Cathedra Mean and Where Did the Catholic Church Come Up with It?, 
CATHOLIC ANSWERS, http://www.catholic.com/quickquestions/what-does-the-term-ex-
cathedra-mean-and-where-did-the-catholic-church-come-up-with-it (defining ex 
cathedra just as Merriam-Webster does).  Justice Scalia used to be the most 
accomplished practitioner of the method (the title to his book on statutory 
interpretation suggests that he might have agreed; reduced to an acronym, it reads A 
Moi).  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997), but now that he has 
died, Justice Alito is likely to be the method’s most accomplished practitioner. 
 46  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13.  Roberts gave “the right not to be injured in one’s person 
by another’s negligence” as an example of a substantive law.  See id.   
 47  See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (“the proper line of approach in determining 
whether [a state rule is] substantive . . . is . . . by inquiring if the . . . rule would 
substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our 
constitutional system leaves to state regulation”) (Harlan, J., concurring); Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 442 n.2 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (substantive law can include a rule that is “undeniably procedural in the 
ordinary sense of the term . . . [but which is] so bound up with the state-created right 
or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy”); John Hart 
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Enabling Act jurisprudence that has lingered to the present day. 
The Court majority rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the term 
“substantive rights” was a synonym for “important and substantial 
rights theretofore recognized.”48  Interpreting the Act in that way, it 
said, would result in endless litigation and confusion as courts tried to 
differentiate between important and unimportant rights.49  That 
difficulty notwithstanding, the Court quickly added that the right to be 
free from a physical examination was not more important than many 
other rights and thus not substantive under even the plaintiff’s 
definition of the term.50  A Federal Rule is valid under the Enabling 
Act, the Court repeated, if it “really regulates procedure.”  That is all 
you can know, and all you need to know. 
The Court’s second argument to support the “really procedural” 
paraphrase of the Enabling Act’s validity standard was purposivist more 
than textualist.51  The Enabling Act, it said, authorized the creation of 
Rules designed to promote the “speedy, fair and exact determination 
of the truth,” and a rule providing for a compulsory medical 
examination, such as Rule 35, “comport[s] with this policy.”52  This was 
uncontroversial as a description of the Act’s purpose, but the 
connection between that purpose and a compulsory medical 
examination rule needed more of an explanation.  Not all rules that 
accelerate litigation or promote the discovery of truth are authorized 
by the Enabling Act; there are countervailing substantive concerns, 
both federal and state, to be considered.  But the Court did not discuss 
these concerns or take them into account.  Instead, it seemed to 
 
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 725–26 (1974) (adding state laws 
regulating status, and states of mind to Harlan’s idea of “primary” conduct); Redish & 
Murashko, supra note 21, at 57–66 (describing various ways to interpret the substantive 
rights language of the Enabling Act); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 47 (“[T]he 
grant of rulemaking power did not extend to ‘matters involving substantive legal and 
remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy.’”) (quoting Stephen B. 
Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
425, 433 (1986)). 
 48  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11, 13.  
 49  Id. at 13–14. 
 50  Id. at 14. 
 51  The argument was purposivist in the sense that Justice Roberts attributed 
reasonable purposes to the Act rather than deduced purposes from the statements of 
legislators made during the enactment process.  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14–15.  
Purposivism usually is associated with the Legal Process school of interpretation at 
Harvard Law School in the 1950s and 1960s, and while the Legal Process school did 
not emerge as a full-blown view until after the decision in Sibbach, its methods were in 
circulation at the time Roberts wrote.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 228–29 (2006) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL.] (describing 
purposivist interpretation and its connection to the Legal Process school). 
 52  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
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assume that furthering any procedural purpose, however minimal, was 
enough to bring a Federal Rule within the ambit of the Act’s 
authorization.  That was the issue to be decided in Sibbach, however, 
not one to be assumed away. 
The Court concluded its brief discussion of the Act by adding an 
intentionalist argument to the textualist and purposivist ones just 
described.53  Pointing to a House Committee Report on the Bill that 
became the Enabling Act, and to the Notes of the Advisory Committee 
on the Rules on which the House Committee Report was based, the 
Court argued that Congress was aware of Rule 35’s compulsory medical 
examination provision when it reviewed the draft Federal Rules and 
did not delete the provision in approving the Draft.54  Gilding the lily 
a little, it also added that Congress knew that the right to a compulsory 
medical examination had been different under the Conformity Act––
the Enabling Act’s predecessor55––and yet, in a “dog did not bark 
fashion,”56 it permitted a change in that practice to go into effect.  From 
 
 53  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 221–30 (describing the differences between 
intentionalist and purposivist interpretation).  
 54  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15.  Justice Scalia would have been the first to denounce 
reliance on committee reports as a source of statutory meaning.  See Wis. Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e are a 
Government of laws, not of committee reports.”). 
 55  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 12–13. 
 56  The Sir Arthur Conan Doyle story Silver Blaze inspired the expression.  The story 
is about the disappearance of a famous racehorse and the apparent murder of its 
trainer on the eve of an important race.  In the story Sherlock Holmes is able to identify 
the “agent” responsible for the trainer’s death, in part, by noticing something that did 
not happen.  Here is Dr. Watson’s description of Holmes pointing out the importance 
of the non-event to a Scotland Yard inspector. 
As we stepped into the carriage one of the stable-lads held the door open for 
us.  A sudden idea seemed to occur to Holmes, for he leaned forward and 
touched the lad upon the sleeve. 
“You have a few sheep in the paddock,” he said.  “Who attends to them?” 
“I do, sir.” 
“Have you noticed anything amiss with them of late?” 
“Well, sir, not of much account; but three of them have gone lame, sir.” 
I could see that Holmes was extremely pleased, for he chuckled and rubbed 
his hands together. 
“A long shot, Watson; a very long shot,” said he, pinching my arm.  “Gregory, 
let me recommend to your attention this singular epidemic among the sheep.  
Drive on, coachman!” 
Colonel Ross still wore an expression that showed the poor opinion which he 
had formed of my companion’s ability, but I saw by the Inspector’s face that 
his attention had been keenly aroused.   
“You consider that to be important?” he asked. 
“Exceedingly so.” 
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” 
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this inaction, the Court concluded, it was fair to infer that Congress 
intended to authorize the creation of a compulsory medical 
examination rule under the authority of the Enabling Act.57 
At no time did the Court discuss explicitly whether the Enabling 
Act articulated a one- or two-part validity standard.  Perhaps it believed 
it was not possible for a Rule that “really regulates procedure” to have 
more than an incidental or insubstantial effect on substantive rights, 
and thus not possible for it to “abridge, enlarge or modify” such rights.  
If so, it would not matter whether the standard had one or two parts, 
since the analysis would come out the same either way.58  Answering 
the “one- or-two part standard” question is necessary only if a Federal 
Rule that “really regulates procedure” also has more than an incidental 
or insubstantial effect on substantive rights, and the Court in Sibbach 
decided that Rule 35 did not have that effect.  In retrospect, however, 
the Court’s failure to discuss the issue, even to dismiss it as unnecessary 
to the decision, was ill-advised, since it left future federal courts 
(including future Supreme Courts) free to conclude with equal 
legitimacy that Sibbach either had settled the question, or that it had 
left it open for another day. 
While the Sibbach majority failed to take up the “one- or two-part 
standard” issue explicitly, Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion did, 
albeit in a somewhat indirect and oblique manner, and that dissent has 
important lessons for modern day Enabling Act analysis.  Justice 
Frankfurter argued that Rule 35 was invalid because it violated a 
federal policy protecting the “inviolability of the person” articulated in 
the Conformity Act era case of Union Pacific Railway Company v. 
Botsford.59  That federal policy, he said, had historic roots in Anglo-
American law and could not be curtailed “unless by clear and 
 
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” 
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.” 
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 16–17 
(Dover Thrift Editions 2010).  
 57  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15–16.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to deduce a motive 
for acting from a failure to act, of course, but judges from all points on the political 
spectrum seem to like to do it nonetheless.  See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 
547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–
91 (2007). 
 58  Professor Burbank concludes that the “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right” provision was a redundancy and not intended to be an independent 
part of the Enabling Act’s validity standard.  See Burbank, supra note 34, at 1108.  Not 
everyone agrees with his interpretation of the Act.  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 
21, at 67–77 (describing “Burbank’s Mistakes in Interpreting the Rules Enabling Act”). 
 59  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 17–18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  See also Union Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).  
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unquestionable authority of law.”60  A change in a policy so “touching 
the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy,” he 
argued, “ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to 
formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of 
business on the civil side of the federal courts.”61  An “invasion of the 
person,” he continued, “stand[s] on a very different footing from 
questions pertaining to the discovery of documents, pre-trial 
procedure and other devices for the expeditious, economic and fair 
conduct of litigation.”62  He attached little significance to the fact that 
Congress did not delete the physical examination provision before 
approving the draft Rules.  The “Rules are not acts of Congress,” he 
said, and “can not be treated as such. . . .  [T]o draw any inference of 
tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”63  
The change effected by Rule 35, he said, “would require explicit 
legislation.”64 
Frankfurter saw Sibbach as a separation of powers case, and Rule 
35 as invalid because it invaded the lawmaking power of Congress.65  
Even though he did not say so, Frankfurter had to assume that the 
Enabling Act’s “abridge substantive rights” prohibition was a separate 
and independent part of the test for the validity of a Federal Rule.  It 
was clear that Rule 35 regulated practice and procedure, and if that by 
itself was enough to satisfy the Enabling Act’s validity standard, he 
would have had to conclude that the Rule was valid.  Only if the Act 
articulated a two-part validity standard did his argument make sense.  
The Sibbach majority disagreed with Frankfurter about the validity of 
Rule 35 and its disagreement might have been based on the 
assumption that the Enabling Act validity standard had only one part: 
that a Federal Rule was valid if it was a rule of “practice and procedure.”  
But the majority also did not say this, and its failure to do so makes it 
impossible to know the extent to which it considered and resolved the 
“one or two part standard” issue. 
The decision in Sibbach was based on policy considerations as well 
as statutory language.  The Justices disagreed, for example, about 
whether the interest in the uniform application of the Federal Rules 
was superior to the interest in protecting legislative prerogatives.  If the 
 
 60  Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 61  Id. at 18.  The “ought not to be inferred” phrasing seems to acknowledge that 
the Act could be interpreted in more than one way.  
 62  Id.  
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
 65  See id. at 17–18.  
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Federal Rules were to have the same meaning everywhere, federal and 
state legislative enactments sometimes would have to give way.  And if 
legislative enactments were to be given full force and effect, Federal 
Rules would not have the same meaning everywhere.66  It was not 
possible to protect both interests equally.  Unfortunately, the Sibbach 
opinion failed to discuss this policy issue in any detail, making it 
impossible to determine just how large a role it played in the Court’s 
analysis.67  In the end, Sibbach combined a question-begging textualist 
rationale with perfunctory intentionalist and incomplete purposivist 
ones, to justify an ex cathedra pronouncement about the meaning of 
statutory text, expressed in the quaint argot of Yuppiespeak, while 
simultaneously giving short shrift to the policy concerns that underlay 
the debate over the text’s meaning.  These are not the qualities of a 
“final word” on the subject. 
The Supreme Court returned to the task of parsing the Enabling 
Act infrequently over the next few years, and added little of 
significance to Sibbach when it did.  As a consequence, the “really 
regulates procedure” paraphrase became a kind of default statement 
of the Enabling Act’s validity standard for many Justices on the Court,68 
though a close examination of the case law will show this view to be 
more old than venerable.69 
B. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree 
The Court’s first post-Sibbach discussion of the Enabling Act’s 
validity standard, in Mississippi Publishing Corporation v. Murphree,70 also 
continues to play an important role in the interpretation of the Act.71  
In Murphree, the Court was asked to reconcile the service of process 
provision of Federal Rule 4 with Mississippi personal jurisdiction law.  
The plaintiff filed the action in the Northern District of Mississippi and 
served the defendant in the Southern District, where defendant had its 
 
 66  This was one of Justice Scalia’s principal arguments in Shady Grove.  Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 411–12 (2010).  
 67  Justice Stevens later argued that Sibbach failed to discuss the issue because the 
parties in the case did not raise it.  See id. at 427–28 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 68  See id. at 407 (describing the “single criterion” test as something the Court has 
“long held”). 
 69  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 74–76 (describing the post-Sibbach 
legislative history of the Enabling Act); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 52 (arguing 
the Court’s 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act were an attempt to provide a 
standard more faithful to both the Act’s original understanding and its evolving 
needs). 
 70  Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
 71  Shady Grove relies heavily on Murphree in its interpretation of the Enabling Act.  
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. 
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principal place of business and a registered agent.72  The defendant 
moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Mississippi law did not 
provide for personal jurisdiction in the Southern District and that 
permitting service there amounted to a modification of state personal 
jurisdiction law in violation of Federal Rule 82.73  The Supreme Court 
held for the plaintiff, finding that Rule 4 “did not affect . . .  
jurisdiction . . . but was intended . . . to provide a procedural means of 
bringing [a] defendant before the court” when the defendant 
otherwise was subject to the court’s jurisdiction.74  As such, it did not 
conflict with Rule 82’s prohibition on extending personal jurisdiction. 
The Murphree Court discussed the Enabling Act briefly, in a single 
paragraph at the end of its opinion, to make two points, one 
uncontroversial and the other unsubstantiated.  It repeated Sibbach’s 
familiar nostrum that “Congress’s prohibition of any alteration of 
substantive rights . . . was obviously not addressed to . . . incidental 
effects . . . upon the rights of litigants who . . . have been brought before 
a court authorized to determine their rights.”75  The Court also 
concluded that Rule 4 did “not abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of 
decision by which [the district] court will adjudicate [the defendant’s] 
rights,” because the Rule related “merely to ‘the manner and the 
means by which a right to recover . . . [would be] enforced.’”76  Thus, 
the Court said, Rule 4 was “a rule of procedure and not of substantive 
right, and [was] not subject to the prohibition of the Enabling Act.”77 
Some read these brief comments to mean that the Court adopted 
the “single criterion” view of the Enabling Act validity standard,78 but 
the Murphree opinion as a whole paints a slightly different picture.  
While the Court did say that Rule 4 does not abridge, enlarge, or 
 
 72  Murphree, 326 U.S. at 439–40.  At the time, Rule 4 authorized service of process 
“anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held” 
when “the state embraces two or more [judicial] districts.”  Id. at 443–44.  The Court 
held that “[b]y designating an agent to receive service of process and consenting to be 
sued in the courts of the state, the corporation had consented to suit in the district 
court . . . .”  Id. at 442.   
 73  See id. at 443–46.  At the time, Rule 82 provided that the Federal Rules “shall 
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United 
States.”  Id. at 443. 
 74  See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 444–46.  Mississippi law provided for personal 
jurisdiction wherever the defendant had an agent for receipt of service, but the 
defendant argued that the statute did not apply in federal court.  The Supreme Court 
held otherwise.  See id. at 443.  See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 75  Id. at 445. 
 76  Id. at 446 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)). 
 77  Id. 
 78  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 413 n.12 
(2010). 
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modify any substantive right, it did so gratuitously, under 
circumstances in which there was no state substantive right to abridge.79  
The Court eliminated any potential conflict between Rule 4 and state 
law when it held that appointing an agent for receipt of service of 
process under state law operated as consent to jurisdiction in both state 
and federal court, and not just state court as the defendant had 
argued.80  Thus interpreted, state law did not conflict with Rule 4 and 
the two rules could be applied in combination, with Rule 4 controlling 
the issue of service. 
Given the absence of any direct collision between state and federal 
law, the Court’s quotation of Sibbach’s “incidental effects” and “manner 
and means” language was a statement of abstract principles more than 
a legal conclusion necessary to the decision in the case.  The statement 
that Rule 4 “does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules 
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [the plaintiff’s] 
rights,”81 was even more confusing.  It mixed Rules of Decision Act 
language (“rules of decision”) with Enabling Act language (“abridge, 
enlarge or modify”), to make a point required by neither act.82  The 
Court appeared to be quoting language for the sake of quoting it, 
rather than expressing a reasoned conclusion about the validity of 
Federal Rule 4.  Given these confusions, the Murphree opinion left all 
of the hard Enabling Act issues right where it found them—
unresolved. 
C.  Hanna v. Plumer 
The Court’s most extensive discussion of the Enabling Act’s 
validity standard after Sibbach came in the celebrated case of Hanna v. 
Plumer,83 but here too, the Court failed to say whether the standard had 
 
 79  See Murphree, 326 U.S. at 445–46.  Unlike in Sibbach, there also was no federal 
substantive right in Murphree with which Rule 4 might conflict.  The personal 
jurisdictional authority of the federal court was based on state law. 
 80  Id. at 443. 
 81  Id. at 446. 
 82  “Rules of decision” is a synonym for “substantive law” in a Decision Act context, 
see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938) (“[I]n all matters except 
those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising 
jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the 
law of the state.”), but as Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), makes clear, the Rules 
of Decision Act and Rules Enabling Act define “substantive” differently.  Id. at 471 
(“The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ shifts as the legal context changes. . . . 
both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply 
state ‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’ law, but from that it need not follow 
that the tests are identical.”); thus, the Court’s use of Decision Act terminology in an 
Enabling Act context is confusing. 
 83  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).  None of the Enabling Act cases between 
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one or two parts.  Hanna involved a dispute over the adequacy of 
service of process.  Unlike Sibbach and Murphree, Hanna also involved a 
direct collision between a Federal Rule and a state law.  The plaintiff 
had served the defendant by leaving copies of a summons and 
complaint with the defendant’s wife at the family residence, as 
authorized by then-Federal Rule 4(d)(1).84  Massachusetts State law, on 
the other hand, required that the defendant be served “in hand”; 
“usual place of abode” service was not adequate.85  The defendant 
argued that state law governed the issue of service and moved for 
summary judgment based on the lack of adequate service.  The district 
court granted the motion, and the First Circuit affirmed, holding that 
the dispute involved “a substantive rather than a procedural matter” 
and that, as such, Erie (i.e., the Rules of Decision Act), required the 
application of state law.86  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed.87 
 
Hanna and Shady Grove makes any fundamental changes in Hanna’s interpretation of 
the Act.  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) presented the Court 
with an opportunity to do so, but only Justice Scalia thought the Enabling Act issue in 
that case was worth discussing, see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and 
Justice Ginsburg dismissed his argument in a footnote.  See id. at 437 n.22 (majority 
opinion). 
 84  At the time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provided: 
Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an individual other than an infant 
or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the 
complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling 
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion 
then residing therein . . . . 
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 4(d)(1) (amended 1993)).  The Rule 
has been amended substantially since then.   
 85  See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1958) 
(repealed 2012)).  At the time, the law provided, in relevant part, that: 
[A]n executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a 
creditor of the deceased which is not commenced within one year from the 
time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, . . . unless before the 
expiration thereof the writ in such action has been served by delivery in hand 
upon such executor or administrator . . . . 
Id. 
 86  See Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964), rev’d, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965).  The First Circuit opinion in Hanna did not cite to Erie, but it based its decision 
on the fact that, as the Court put it, “we are concerned with a substantive rather than 
procedural matter.”  Id.  The Court found the Massachusetts state statute substantive, 
and cited to the Cohen and Ragan cases (rather than Erie) for authority.  Id.  Cohen was 
grounded on Erie, see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–57 
(1949), and Ragan distinguished itself from Erie, since it involved a Federal Rule and 
thus raised an issue under the Rules Enabling Act rather than the Rules of Decision 
Act.  See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530, 532–33 
(1949). 
 87  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.  The Court divided its discussion into three distinct 
sections.  The first expressed its principal Enabling Act analysis.  Id. at 464–65.  The 
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The Court began its analysis by finding Rule 4 pertinent to the 
issue in dispute.88  The issue was adequacy of service and Rule 4 
provided the federal standard for service of process.  The Rule also 
passed muster as a rule of practice and procedure under subsection 
(a) of the Enabling Act since it defined the notice obligation for 
commencing a lawsuit, said nothing about how to resolve the 
substantive issues in dispute, and had no continuing effect in a lawsuit 
once it was complied with.89  Its principal purpose and effect were 
procedural, in other words, and that made it “rationally capable of 
classification” as procedural.90 
At that point, the Court should have turned its attention to 
subsection (b) of the Enabling Act and asked whether the defendant’s 
right to in-hand service under Massachusetts law was substantive, and 
if so, whether the application of Rule 4 would abridge that right; but it 
did not do this.  Instead, it found that the differences between the state 
and federal service rules were not substantial enough to cause Rule 4 
to “abridge” the rights created by the Massachusetts statute, whatever 
their nature.91  Consequently, Rule 4 did not “exceed[] the 
congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act . . . and 
[was] . . . the standard against which the District Court should have 
measured the adequacy of the service.”92  In a sense, the Court treated 
the Enabling Act’s validity standard as having two parts, but found the 
second part satisfied under its “abridgement,” rather than “substantive 
rights,” component.  The Court did not say this explicitly, however, 
leaving future courts free to decide for themselves whether the 
 
second explained why Erie did not govern the issue. Id. at 469–72.  The third returned 
to the Enabling Act analysis to make minor changes in the description of the Act’s 
validity standard.  Id. at 472–74.  Hanna is perhaps best known for its refinement of the 
outcome determination test for the Rules of Decision Act, but for our purposes, its 
Enabling Act analysis is more important. 
 88  Id. at 464–65. 
 89  Id. (Rule 4 “does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision 
by which [the] court will adjudicate [petitioner’s] rights.”). 
 90  See id. at 472. 
 91  Hanna has been criticized for using the similarity of the state and federal service 
rules as an excuse for passing on the opportunity to say whether section (b) of the 
Enabling Act articulated an independent test for determining the validity of the 
Federal Rule, and a fortiori, for failing to define the concept “substantive rights” 
referred to in that section, see Ely, supra note 47, at 720–21, and there may be merit to 
the criticism.  The differences between the two rules were enough to change the 
outcome in the case.  See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465–66.  On the other hand, while 
Professor Ely has argued that the Massachusetts statute did not create substantive 
rights, Ely, supra note 47, at 732–33, others have disagreed, see Abram Chayes, The Bead 
Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 751–52 (1974), and the issue is far from easy. 
 92  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464. 
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Enabling Act’s validity standard had one or two parts.93  For all of its 
extended discussion of the Enabling Act’s text, Hanna did little to clear 
up the lingering confusion over the Act’s central unresolved issue: 
whether its validity standard had one or two parts. 
D.  Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. 
The next important case to interpret the Enabling Act,94 Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corporation,95 also failed to resolve the “one- or two-part 
validity standard” issue, but for a different reason.96  Walker involved a 
dispute over when an action was commenced for state statute of 
limitations purposes.  The state law in Walker provided that an action 
was commenced upon service of process, but Federal Rule 3 provided 
that it was commenced upon filing.97  The plaintiff filed his case but 
did not serve the defendant within the state limitations period,98 and 
 
 93  There might be situations in which it is not possible to avoid the question of 
whether the Enabling Act validity standard has one or two parts.  The case law does 
not provide a ready example, but it is possible to imagine one.  Consider a variation 
on the Hanna facts in which Massachusetts has a statute prohibiting litigation-related 
activity of any kind from being conducted in a person’s home.  Assume that the statute 
was passed to protect the privacy of home life, and that Massachusetts considered 
privacy a substantive right.  (Such a statute might insulate Massachusetts citizens who 
never left home from being sued, but the Commonwealth might think this possibility 
so unlikely as not to pose a significant risk to any important state interest.)  In such a 
circumstance, Rule 4 still would qualify as a rule of “practice and procedure” under 
section (a) of the Enabling Act, but now it also would have more than an insubstantial 
or incremental effect on a conflicting state right––it would destroy that right 
completely.  If the Enabling Act is read literally, a court faced with such a situation 
would need to determine if section (b) of the Act states a separate and independent 
part of the test for determining the validity of a Federal Rule, and if it does, whether a 
state privacy right is substantive in the sense that term is used in the Enabling Act (since 
a state legislature cannot define the meaning of a federal law). 
 94  Shady Grove includes Walker in the list of cases it uses to interpret the Enabling 
Act.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. at 421–22.  
 95  Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).  Walker was a clone of Ragan 
v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).  The Supreme Court called 
the two cases “indistinguishable,” in part because the “predecessor to the Oklahoma 
statute in [Walker] was derived from the predecessor to the Kansas statute in Ragan.”  
Walker, 446 U.S. at 748.  Ordinarily one would not expect to find identical cases in the 
Supreme Court only thirty years apart, but many thought Hanna had overruled Ragan.  
Walker made it clear that it did not.  Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50. 
 96  Walker also is important for its contribution to the question of whether the 
Federal Rules should be read narrowly to avoid conflicts with state law.  Justice 
Ginsburg adopted this view in Shady Grove, but the Court in Walker rejected the idea 
and said the Rules should be given their ordinary meaning.  Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 
n.9. 
 97  See id. at 742. 
 98  Id. at 742–43.  The statute permitted the defendant to be served within sixty 
days of filing, even if outside the applicable limitations period.  Id. at 743.  See also 
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531–32 n.4 (interpretation of an identical commencement of the 
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the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that state law controlled.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that Rule 3 was not 
intended “to toll a state statute of limitations, much less . . . to displace 
state tolling rules . . . .  Rule 3 governs the date from which various 
timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run . . . .”99  Thus 
interpreted, the “scope of the Federal Rule [was] not as broad as [the 
plaintiff] urge[d],”100 and, “there being no Federal Rule [governing] 
the point in dispute, Erie command[ed] the enforcement of state 
law.”101 
Walker was a pertinence case, not an Enabling Act one, 
notwithstanding that the validity of a Federal Rule seemed to be one 
of the issues in dispute.  When the Court held that Rule 3 did not 
define commencement of an action for statute of limitations purposes, 
however, it took the issue of the Rule’s validity off the table.102  There 
was no need to examine that question if the Rule did not apply to any 
issue before the court.  Thus resolved, Walker added nothing to 
Enabling Act analysis.  Some commentators question the Court’s good 
faith in deciding Walker on a pertinence ground, arguing that such a 
narrow reading of Rule 3 was inconsistent with the Court’s expansive 
reading of Rule 4 in Hanna,103 but this criticism is unwarranted.  
Finding that Rule 4 did not govern service of process in Hanna would 
have read Rule 4 out of existence.  The Rule had no purpose other 
than to regulate service.  Rule 3 had a life as a timing rule, however, 
both for other parts of the Federal Rules and perhaps federal statutes 
of limitations,104 and interpreting it not to govern the issue of when an 
action was commenced for state statute of limitations purposes did not 
read it out of existence.  That fact, combined with the Court’s 
legitimate concern about modifying state substantive law through a 
 
action statute). 
 99  Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–51. 
 100  Id. at 750. 
 101  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470).  Id. at 752 
(“Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state law, the 
Hanna analysis does not apply.”). 
 102  See, e.g., id. at 752 n.14 (“Since we hold that Rule 3 does not apply, it is 
unnecessary for us to address the second question posed by the Hanna analysis: 
whether Rule 3, if it applied, would be outside the scope of the Rules Enabling Act or 
beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution.”). 
 103  See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 
(11th ed. 2013) (“Why is Rule 4 read broadly, making a clash with state law 
‘unavoidable,’ while Rule 3 is read to incorporate an implied exception for state 
statutes?”). 
 104  The Court withheld judgment on the latter issue.  See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752 
n.14. 
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Federal Rule (statutes of limitations are substantive under the Rules of 
Decision Act),105 was more than enough to establish the reasonableness 
of the Court’s view.106 
E.  Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Woods107 is the last in the 
line of cases cited in Shady Grove to support the “single criterion” view 
of the Enabling Act’s validity standard.  That case, like Hanna, involved 
a direct collision between state and federal law.  A district court jury 
awarded the plaintiffs $300,000 for injuries sustained in a motorcycle 
accident, the defendants appealed the verdict, and the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed it.108  The plaintiffs (respondents on appeal) moved 
for the imposition of a mandatory ten percent affirmance penalty 
required by Alabama state law.109  The defendant Railroad (petitioner 
on appeal) objected, arguing that the award of a penalty on appeal was 
governed by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
that Rule 38 provided for a discretionary penalty only if the appeal was 
frivolous.110  The Eleventh Circuit held that state law, not Rule 38, 
governed the issue, and imposed a ten percent penalty on the 
Railroad.111  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 38 
governed because the Rule was valid under the Enabling Act and, 
because it occupied the same field of operation as the Alabama law, it 
pre-empted the state law.112 
The Rule’s purpose, the Court said, was “to penalize frivolous 
appeals and appeals interposed for delay,”113 and this made it 
“rationally capable of classification as [procedural]”114 under the 
 
 105  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945). 
 106  The Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules raised the question of whether 
Rule 3 should be read to toll a state statute of limitations, but expressed no opinion 
on how it should be resolved.  See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.10. 
 107  Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Burlington 
Northern]. 
 108  Id. at 2.  
 109  Id. at 3.  
 110  Id. at 4. 
 111  Id. at 1.  
 112  See id. at 8. 
 113  Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4. 
 114  Id. at 5.  The “rationally capable” standard is the test for determining the validity 
of a federal statute under the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, not the validity of a 
Federal Rule under the Enabling Act.  See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 
22, 31–32 (1998) (describing how a federal statute is tested directly against the 
Constitution to determine if it comes within a grant of federal legislative power).  The 
mistake was harmless, however, since the Judiciary Article and section (a) of the 
Enabling Act use the same language and have been interpreted to mean the same 
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“practice and procedure” requirement of subsection (a) of the 
Enabling Act.  If the Court thought the Act’s validity standard had only 
one part it would have stopped there, but it did not.  Instead, it went 
on to find that “the Rules Enabling Act . . . contains an additional 
requirement” that a “Federal Rule must not ‘abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.’”115  The characterization of this 
requirement as “additional” seemed to acknowledge that the Enabling 
Act standard had two parts, and that it was not reducible to a “really 
regulates procedure” paraphrase.  But, like Enabling Act cases before 
it, Burlington Northern failed to say this explicitly and thus left the issue 
still in doubt. 
The Court then combined an “incidental effects” argument 
reminiscent of the discussion in Hanna116 with a policy argument 
reminiscent of Sibbach,117 to avoid examining the nature of the right 
created by the Alabama law.118  Rule 38, the Court acknowledged, had 
an incidental effect on the state law right, but this was acceptable under 
the Enabling Act because the effect was an inevitable consequence of 
the uniform application of the Federal Rules.119  In effect, the court 
read an exception into the Enabling Act, rather than defined its terms 
narrowly as in Hanna;120 but the difference between the two moves was 
cosmetic more than substantive, since the result in both cases was to 
interpret the Act to mean less than it said.  The Court’s failure to say 
definitively whether the Act’s validity standard had one or two parts 
continued the Court’s past practice of equivocating on that issue, and 
left Burlington Northern somewhat limited as an Enabling Act 
 
thing. 
 115  Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966) (amended 
1988)). 
 116  Id. at 5 (“The Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an additional requirement.  
The Federal Rule must not ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . .’  28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the 
development of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice 
and procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights 
do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that 
system of rules.”); see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (citing Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1941)) (“Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of 
substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as 
necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure . . . .”). 
 117  See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (arguing for an interpretation of the Enabling Act 
that avoids endless litigation and confusion). 
 118  See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5–6. 
 119  See id. at 5 (“Rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not 
violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of 
rules [of procedure].”).   
 120  In effect, it read section (b) of the Act to say: “Such rules shall not substantially 
abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights.” 
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precedent. 
Enabling Act decisions after Burlington Northern do not add much 
to the preceding story.  Most deal with unusual fact situations, narrowly 
defined legal issues, or idiosyncratic disagreements over pertinence 
and, as a result, they have limited implications for interpreting the Act.  
These cases now contain so many distinctive perspectives that it is 
difficult to know which justices believe what with respect to the Act’s 
validity standard.  The case law does not lack for authorial firepower—
many highly regarded justices have taken a turn at parsing the Act121—
and yet not one has been able to produce the definitive interpretation 
needed to put the question of the Act’s meaning to rest.122  Perhaps the 
Court thought it was ready to announce such an interpretation when 
it took certiorari in Shady Grove, but if so, it soon learned that not all 
expectations are realized. 
III.  SHADY GROVE 
In a series of opinions produced by some moderately surprising 
alliances,123 only one of which commanded five votes, the Shady Grove 
case separated the debate over the meaning of the Enabling Act into 
three distinct sub-parts.  The Justices disagreed over whether to 
interpret the Act from a rule or policy perspective; if policy, what 
policy; and if rule, what understanding of the rule.  Justices Ginsburg, 
Scalia,124 and Stevens now were the principal antagonists, and while the 
issues on which they disagreed were similar to those separating Justices 
 
 121  The list includes Justice Frankfurter in Sibbach (dissenting); Justice Stone in 
Murphree (majority opinion); Justice Douglas in Ragan (majority opinion); Justices 
Warren (majority opinion) and Harlan (concurring) in Hanna; Justice Marshall in 
Walker (majority opinion) and Burlington Northern (majority opinion); Justice Ginsburg 
in Gasperini (majority opinion); and Justice Scalia in Gasperini (dissenting), Semtek 
(majority opinion), and Shady Grove (majority opinion). 
 122  Legal scholars have made some efforts in this regard but with limited success.  
Professor Ely’s article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, see Ely, supra note 47, is the most 
well-known example.  Most (though not all) major Procedure scholars approved of 
Ely’s basic framework for doing Enabling Act analysis when he first articulated it, even 
though some disagreed about its application in particular cases; but over the years his 
view gradually has lost favor.  See Condlin, Formstone, supra note 2, at 476–80, 558–59 
(describing the initial appeal and gradual decline in the popularity of Ely’s view). 
 123  The Shady Grove facts involved a “little guy-big guy,” “individual-corporation,” 
“states’ rights-federal rights,” “plaintiff-defendant,” “democrat-republican” dispute, 
and Ginsburg and Scalia came down on the opposite sides of what one would have 
predicted in each of these dichotomies.  This makes it hard to explain the decision as 
a consequence of a result-oriented jurisprudence.  Something principled, or confused, 
must be at the base of it; see Stempel, supra note 15, at 911 (“Shady Grove was . . . a 
wonderful departure from the Court’s seemingly predictable ideological divide that 
has characterized other close cases in recent years.”). 
 124  See supra note 14. 
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Roberts and Frankfurter in Sibbach (and the various other Justices 
paired in the voting over the years), they also were different in 
significant respects.  Unfortunately, these differences made the lines 
in the sand in Enabling Act jurisprudence more pronounced than 
ever.125 
The Shady Grove case itself involved a dispute over statutory 
interest on an insurance subrogation claim.126  Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates provided medical care to Sonia Galvez and, as 
partial payment for that care, Galvez assigned Shady Grove her rights 
to reimbursement under an insurance policy issued by Allstate 
Insurance.  Shady Grove filed a claim on the policy and Allstate paid 
it, but not within the thirty days required by New York state law.127  This 
made Allstate liable for statutory interest under another New York law, 
but the company refused to pay the interest.128  Shady Grove filed a 
diversity action against Allstate in the Eastern District of New York, 
seeking to recover the interest owed it and the class of all other health 
care providers Allstate had not paid in time under the New York 
statute.129  The District Court refused to certify the class, however, 
finding that yet another New York statute prohibited class actions in 
suits to recover penalties, and that statutory interest was a penalty.130  
The Court also dismissed Shady Grove’s individual claim because it fell 
short of the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction.131  
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the New York penalty 
statute created substantive rights under Erie and as such, had to be 
applied by a federal court sitting in diversity.132  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.133 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court.134  He began with 
 
 125  See Clermont, supra note 18, at 1029 (Shady Grove’s “splintered opinions will lead 
lower court judges for a while to see the doors [to accommodating the federalism and 
separation of powers issues in dispute] as slightly ajar”). 
 126  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 396–97 
(2010). 
 127  Id. at 397.  Professor Stempel has described the enactment of the New York 
statutory interest statute and the purposes it was designed to serve in authoritative 
detail.  See Stempel, supra note 15, at 932–67.  
 128  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. at 398. 
 133  Id. at 398, 416. 
 134  Justices Roberts, Stevens, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined Scalia in Part I of the 
opinion (describing the facts and procedural posture of the case), and Part II-A 
(discussing whether Rule 23 was pertinent to the issue in dispute).  Justices Roberts, 
Thomas, and Sotomayor joined Scalia in Part II-B (discussing whether the Enabling 
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the pertinence issue, asking whether the New York penalty statute or 
Federal Rule 23 governed the issue of class certification.135  Was there 
a direct collision between the two rules, he asked, so that they could 
not be applied consistently with one another, or did they govern 
different issues?136  The Second Circuit had thought the rules were 
compatible—that Rule 23 governed the issue of whether the class 
could be certified and the New York statute governed the antecedent 
issue of whether a claim was eligible for class certification in the first 
instance—but Justice Scalia dismissed this distinction as “entirely 
artificial.”137  Both rules, he argued, articulated “preconditions for 
maintaining a class action.”138  “Relabeling Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites 
as ‘eligibility criteria’ would obviate [the Court’s] objection,” he said, 
but this was “a sure sign that [the] certifiability–eligibility distinction 
[was] made-to-order.”139  In his view, it was not possible to apply both 
rules to the class certification issue.  One or the other had to control, 
and that one was Rule 23. 
Justice Ginsburg disagreed, but for a different reason from that of 
the Second Circuit.140  Rule 23, she argued, regulated “the procedural 
 
Act articulated a “single criterion” test for determining the validity of the Federal 
Rules), and Part II-D (discussing whether Rule 23 was valid), and Justices Roberts and 
Thomas joined him in Part II-C (responding to Justice Stevens’s conflicting 
interpretation of Sibbach).  Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion 
providing the fifth vote for the Court’s judgment on the merits of the case, and Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito joined.  There 
was no majority view on the question of whether the Enabling Act validity standard 
had one or two parts, though Professor Roosevelt seems to believe otherwise.  See 
Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 51 (“The Justices split 5-4 over whether to give independent 
significance to the Rules Enabling Act’s ‘shall not abridge’ language, with five agreeing 
that they should . . . .”).  The citation he gives to support this conclusion says only that 
“Federal Rules must be interpreted with some degree of ‘sensitivity to important state 
interests and regulatory policies,’ . . . and applied to diversity cases against the 
background of Congress’ command that such rules not alter substantive rights and 
with consideration of the ‘degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of 
the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in state courts.’”  This 
proposition, taken from Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove, mixes and matches 
Enabling Act and Rules of Decision Act language with federalism principles in a 
manner that makes it difficult to determine precisely what point is being made. 
 135  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 396–99. 
 136  See id. 
 137  See id. at 399. 
 138  See id. 
 139  See id. 
 140  Justice Ginsburg discussed the issue in terms of the “direct collision” language 
of Hanna, asking if the New York and Federal rules inevitably conflicted, or whether 
they could be applied together.  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438–39 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  “Our decisions . . . caution us to ask, before undermining state legislation: 
Is this conflict really necessary?”  Id. at 437.  She also invoked the narrow construction 
principle disavowed by the Court in Walker, adding that if the Court “interpreted [Rule 
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aspects of class litigation,” and the New York statute regulated “the size 
of a monetary award a class plaintiff may pursue.”141  One rule was about 
procedure and the other was about remedy, and as such, the two rules 
could be applied compatibly with one another.  The only question in 
the case, as she saw it, was whether the “Erie doctrine”142 required the 
application of the New York statute.143  For her, Shady Grove was a 
federalism case,144 and the Rules of Decision Act, not the Enabling Act, 
was the controlling authority.145  She also agreed with the Second 
Circuit that the New York penalty statute was substantive and that, 
under Erie, the district court had to apply it.146 
Justice Scalia rejected this procedure–remedy distinction as 
peremptorily as he had rejected the Second Circuit’s eligibility–
 
23] with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies” the rules 
do not conflict.  See id. at 437.  But see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 
n.4 (1988) (“direct collision” not necessary for an Enabling Act problem); see also 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 742, 750 n.9 (1980) (disavowing the principle 
that a Federal Rule must be construed narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law). 
 141  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 446–47.  Ginsburg based this characterization of the 
New York statute on what she took to be its purpose.  As she put it, “while phrased as 
responsive to the question whether certain class actions may begin, § 901(b) is 
unmistakably aimed at controlling how those actions must end.”  Id. at 450.  The statute 
responds to the concern that allowing statutory damages to be awarded on a class-wide 
basis would “produce overkill.”  See id. at 444.  Scalia countered with the well-known 
textualist argument that a court must enforce a legislature’s actions, not its purposes.  
See id. at 403.  As he put it, “[t]he manner in which the law ‘could have been written,’ 
has no bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature did enact.”  Id. at 403 (majority 
opinion) (emphasis in original).  He described the familiar catalogue of difficulties 
involved in trying to ascertain legislative purpose and concluded that “[w]hatever the 
policies [the New York statute and Rule 23] pursue, they flatly contradict each other.”  
See id. at 405.  But see Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 53 (“Scalia’s rather wooden textualism 
does not make much sense when trying to determine how a statute should operate in 
contexts the lawmakers did not contemplate.”). 
 142  Presumably Justice Ginsburg meant the Rules of Decision Act.  The “Erie 
doctrine” is not a law.  See infra note 219. 
 143  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437–38, 452 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted) (“I would decide this case by inquiring whether application of the [state] rule 
would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants 
that failure to [apply the state law] would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the 
federal court.”). 
 144  See id. at 451 (“By finding a conflict without considering whether Rule 23 
rationally should be read to avoid any collision, the Court unwisely and unnecessarily 
retreats from the federalism principles undergirding Erie.”).  
 145  See generally id. at 443–45.  This probably explains why Justice Ginsburg began 
her analysis by discussing the status of the New York statute rather than the validity of 
Rule 23.  If Rule 23 was pertinent and valid it would not matter if the New York statute 
was a “rule of decision”—Rule 23 would govern.  This is the same sequencing mistake 
she made in Gasperini.  See Condlin, Formstone, supra note 2, at 527–28 (describing the 
illogical sequence of Ginsburg’s analysis in Gasperini). 
 146  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 452–58 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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certifiability one before it because, as he put it, regulating remedy is 
“not what [the New York statute] does.”147  By its own terms, he said, 
“the [statute] precludes a plaintiff from maintaining a class action . . . 
[it says] nothing about what remedies a court may award.”148  The state 
statute, he continued, “prevents the class actions it covers from coming 
into existence at all,”149 and because of this, the conflict between the 
state rule and the Federal Rule was unavoidable; the two rules could 
not be applied compatibly.  Justice Stevens joined on this pertinence 
point to create a majority for the conclusion that Rule 23 governed the 
class certification issue, and in doing so, left only the issue of Rule 23’s 
validity to be resolved.150 
Turning to that question, Justice Scalia argued that the Enabling 
Act, as interpreted in Sibbach, articulated a “single criterion” standard 
for determining the validity of a Federal Rule.151  To be valid under the 
Act, he said, repeating Sibbach’s well-known phrase, a Rule must “really 
regulate procedure.”152  If it does this, no further inquiry is needed; the 
Rule is valid and must be applied.153  A Rule “really regulates 
procedure,” he continued, “if it governs only ‘the manner and the 
means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced’”; the Rule does not 
regulate procedure “if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [a] court 
will adjudicate [those] rights.’”154  Applying that criterion to Rule 23, 
he concluded that the Rule qualified as one of “manner and means” 
because it allowed “multiple claims (and claims by or against multiple 
parties) to be litigated together . . . [and left] the parties’ legal 
rights . . . unchanged.”155  As a consequence, it was not necessary to ask 
 
 147  See id. at 401 (majority opinion). 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  See id. at 406–10. 
 151  Id. at 411–12.  Scalia was joined on this view by only three other Justices. 
 152  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407. 
 153  Scalia added that Congress was free to rewrite the Act if it did not like this 
reading of it, see id. at 413–14, though he did not say how it could make the intention 
to enact a two-part standard clearer. 
 154  See id. at 407 (citation omitted).  This was familiar language: all of the Enabling 
Act cases had used it, but the expression “manner and means” is not a great deal 
clearer than the expression “really regulates procedure,” so Justice Scalia gave 
examples of Federal Rules that over the years had been held to regulate the “manner 
and means” of enforcing substantive rights.  Id.  These examples included rules 
authorizing service of process, providing for mental and physical examinations, and 
permitting sanctions for signing court papers without a reasonable inquiry.  Id.  Each 
of these rules, he said, “had some practical effect on the parties’ rights, but each 
undeniably regulated only the process for enforcing those rights; none altered the 
rights themselves.”  Id. at 407–08. 
 155  See id. at 408. 
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whether the New York penalty statute created substantive rights.  
“[T]he substantive nature of [the] New York law . . . makes no 
difference,”156 only the nature of the Federal Rule mattered.157 
Justice Scalia might have intended to limit this “single criterion” 
reading of the Enabling Act to the familiar situation in which a Federal 
Rule had only an incidental or insubstantial effect on substantive 
rights, and take no position on the more difficult question of whether 
a Federal Rule is valid if it abridges substantive rights completely.  He 
did not say this directly, but he seemed to imply that a rule written in 
the procedural language required by the Enabling Act could never 
abridge substantive rights because language was not that malleable.  
On the other hand, he also seemed to suggest that sometimes 
sacrificing substantive state law was just an inevitable consequence of 
preserving a uniform system of federal procedure.  Either way, in his 
view, subsection (b) of the Enabling Act said the same thing as 
subsection (a); it just said it again, louder.  He admitted that his 
reading of the Act “gives short shrift to the statutory text,”158 but argued 
that Sibbach had interpreted the Act in that way,159 and “Sibbach has been 
settled law . . . for nearly seven decades.”160  Setting aside such a 
longstanding and well-settled precedent, he said, would “require[] a 
‘special justification’ beyond a bare belief that it was wrong,”161 and he 
found no such justification in Shady Grove.162 
Justice Stevens made the most sustained objection to this “single 
 
 156  Id. at 409. 
 157  See id. at 416.  Justice Scalia supported this reading of the Act with an argument 
based on a combination of Sibbach and Hanna.  As he put it, 
[T]he validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates 
procedure. . . .  If it does, it is authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all 
jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon 
state-created rights . . . . To the extent Sibbach did not [say this], Hanna surely 
did. 
Id. at 410, 412 n.9 (citation omitted).  The use of Hanna as a backup in the event the 
argument from Sibbach fails suggests that Scalia may have had doubts about the 
argument from Sibbach.  
 158  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 412.  
 159  See id. at 411–13. 
 160  Id. at 413.  Interestingly enough, about a decade earlier Justice Scalia had 
treated the Act as having a two-part validity standard.  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (arguing that “to find a rule governing the 
effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules 
governing the internal procedures of the rendering court itself . . . would arguably 
violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules ‘shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right . . . .’”) (citation omitted).  
 161 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 413 (citation omitted). 
 162  See id. at 414 (“Why we should cast aside our decades-old decision escapes us, 
especially since . . . that would not affect the result.”). 
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criterion” view,163 grounding his argument principally on the 
“Surplusage” canon of statutory construction.164  He argued, in a 
manner more commonly identified with Justice Scalia, that all parts of 
a statute’s text must be given effect, and that Congress is presumed to 
have intended everything it enacts.165  Sibbach failed to discuss the 
Enabling Act’s independent prohibition on abridging substantive 
rights, Stevens argued, because the parties did not raise the issue, not 
because the Court thought the prohibition was redundant.166 
Justice Scalia responded with a statutory construction argument 
of his own, grounded in what one might think of as the “Interpretive 
Gloss” canon.167  The meaning of a statute, he argued, is found not only 
in its text, but also in the interpretation given that text in case law over 
the years.  The “single criterion” interpretation of the Enabling Act 
validity standard attributed to Sibbach, he continued, had been so 
widely and consistently followed as precedent for such a long time that 
it simply was too late in the game to begin the interpretation process 
all over again––too late to read the Enabling Act literally, as if one was 
reading it for the first time.168  The “really regulates procedure” 
paraphrase of the Act’s validity standard was “settled law,” he said, and 
 
 163  See id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Rule 23 does not collide 
with § 901(b)).  Justice Ginsburg made the strongest objections to Justice Scalia’s views 
in the Shady Grove opinion as a whole, but given her position that Rule 23 was not 
pertinent to the issue in dispute, she did not discuss the question of whether the Rule 
was valid, and thus did not discuss Justice Scalia’s Sibbach-based “single criterion” 
interpretation of the Enabling Act validity standard. 
 164  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 275 (describing the “rule against surplusage,” 
referred to as the “rule that the specific statute controls the general”).  But see Redish 
& Murashko, supra note 21, at 37–38 (describing how the surplusage canon “when 
critically examined, might lose its bite for several reasons”).  
 165  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The question, 
therefore, is not what rule we think would be easiest on federal courts.  The question 
is what rule Congress established.  Although, Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily 
administrable, bright-line rules, his preference does not give us license to adopt a 
second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act.  Courts cannot ignore text and 
context in the service of simplicity.”). 
 166  See id. at 427.  Justice Stevens also adopted Professor Ely’s view that Sibbach 
passed on the opportunity to define the meaning of substantive rights because that 
would have resulted in “shifting control from the Federal Rules to the federal courts.”  
See Ely, supra note 47, at 733–37. 
 167  The “interpretive gloss” canon describes a collection of individual canons more 
than a single one, depending upon the particular institution responsible for adding 
the interpretive gloss.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 290 (the reenactment rule), 
at 391 (the acquiescence rule), at 298 (the common law rule), and at 292–94 (the in 
pari materia rule). 
 168  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 413–14 (majority opinion).  Justice Scalia seemed to 
admit that the text of the Act, if read literally, articulated a two-part standard, see id. 
at 411–12, and it seems hard to deny this. 
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only Congress could change it.169 
A disagreement of this sort cannot be resolved at the level of 
interpretive method.  There are no meta canons of statutory 
construction, for example, to say whether the Surplusage canon (and 
the policies embodied in it), or the Interpretive Gloss canon (and the 
policies embodied in it), is more authoritative.  The Justices seemed to 
recognize this, since almost immediately they turned their attention to 
arguments based on the purposes and intentions underlying the 
Enabling Act.  Justice Scalia supported his “single criterion” view, for 
example, with an argument—reminiscent of the Burlington Northern 
case—that the Federal Rules should have the same meaning 
everywhere, all of the time, and in all types of cases.170  He dismissed 
the idea that a Rule could be valid in one state and invalid in another 
depending upon the presence or absence of a particular state law.171  
Protecting federal procedural uniformity, he argued, was more 
important than protecting state legislative prerogatives..172  Good 
textualist that he was, he did not frame his argument as a policy 
preference for uniform rules over legislative prerogatives, but instead 
as an argument for following “settled law.”173  He was not interested in 
policy arguments as such.  The policy debate was over as far as he was 
concerned, because it had been resolved in Sibbach.174 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg denied that the need for federal 
procedural uniformity trumped all other policy considerations, but 
each for a different reason.  Justice Stevens argued that the Enabling 
Act was designed to “balance” the interest in uniform Federal Rules 
against the interest of respecting state legislative prerogatives, not 
 
 169  See id. at 413–14.  Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens also disagreed over the 
proper method for defining “substantive rights” in section (b) of the Act.  Justice Scalia 
thought it proper to interpret the text using only language tools, see id. at 403–06, 
whereas Justice Stevens thought it proper to consider the purposes and effects of the 
Act as well as its text.  See id. at 432–35 (Stevens, J., concurring).  For Justice Stevens, a 
state law that protected substantive policies, even if framed in the language of 
procedure, would count as substantive under the Act.  Id.  In this, he agreed with 
Ginsburg.  See id. at 419–20 (Stevens, J., concurring).  See also id. at 443–445 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
 170  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 412–15 (majority opinion).  
 171  See id. at 409 (“A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions 
and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—depending upon 
whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law . . . .”). 
 172  See id. at 409–10.  Justice Scalia did not say why federal procedural uniformity 
was the superior interest.  He simply assumed that to be the case. 
 173  See id. at 413. 
 174  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.  But see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 41 
(“[T]he Shady Grove Court’s wooden interpretation of Rule 23 was hardly ordained by 
precedent.”). 
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elevate one interest over the other.175  “[W]hile Congress . . . [had] the 
constitutional power to prescribe procedural rules that interfere[d] 
with state substantive law,” he said, “that is not what Congress has 
done” in the Enabling Act.176  The Act’s prohibition on abridging 
substantive rights, he continued, “does not mean that federal rules 
cannot displace state policy judgments; it means only that federal rules 
cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies.”177  
“Congress has . . . struck a balance,” he argued, between housekeeping 
rules for federal courts and state rules that affect the character and 
result of litigation,178 and while “this can be a tricky balance to 
implement,”179 it is what Congress had in mind by including both a 
“practice and procedure” requirement and an “abridgement of 
substantive rights” prohibition in the Enabling Act.180  Stevens would 
have struck the balance in favor of the Federal Rule in Shady Grove 
because, as he saw it, the New York statute was not unambiguously 
substantive.181  But, in a different case with a different state law, the 
balancing could come out the other way.182 
 
 175  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418–19 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 176  Id. at 417–18. 
 177  Id. at 418. 
 178  See id. at 418–19. 
 179  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419.  This is so, said Justice Stevens, because it does not 
depend completely on the form of the state law.  See id. at 419.  “Rather, it turns on 
whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or 
remedies.”  Id. at 419.  “A state procedural rule, though undeniably procedural in the 
ordinary sense of the term, may exist to influence substantive outcomes, . . . and may 
in some instances become so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it 
defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”  Id. at 419–20 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted).  “And were federal courts to ignore those portions 
of substantive state law that operate as procedural devices, it could in many instances 
limit the ways that sovereign States may define their rights and remedies.”  Id. at 420.  
Justice Stevens dismissed the concern that such an inquiry would “enmesh federal 
courts in difficult determinations about whether application of a given rule would 
displace a state determination about substantive rights.”  Id. at 426.  The question, he 
said, “is not what rule we think would be easiest on federal courts.  The question is 
what rule Congress established. . . .  Courts cannot ignore text and context in the 
service of simplicity.”  Id. 
 180  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 424–25 (describing how “Congress struck [a 
balance] between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a State’s 
construction of its own rights and remedies” by including two limitations on the 
construction of federal rules).  
 181  See id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The text of CPLR § 901(b) expressly 
and unambiguously applies not only to claims based on New York law but also to claims 
based on federal law or the law of any other State. . . .  It is therefore hard to see how 
§ 901(b) could be understood as a rule that, though procedural in form, serves the 
function of defining New York’s rights or remedies.”). 
 182  Justice Stevens does not say this explicitly, but it is a logical inference from his 
discussion of the balancing of interests policy he finds at the heart of the Enabling Act.  
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Justice Ginsburg objected to Scalia’s procedural uniformity 
argument for a different reason.  For her, protecting “the federalism 
principles undergirding Erie”183 was more important than preserving 
the uniformity of the Federal Rules.  As she saw it, a federal court 
should “avoid[] immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that 
would trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing 
federal interest.”184  The Erie doctrine, not the Rules of Decision Act or 
Enabling Act, was the ultimate source of this obligation;185 the two 
statutes simply “mark our way”186 in applying that doctrine.187  When 
Rule 23 is interpreted with an “awareness of, and sensitivity to, 
important state regulatory policies,”188 she continued, the Rule did not 
conflict with the New York penalty statute and thus was not pertinent 
to the issue of whether Shady Grove’s claim could be certified as a class 
action.189  If the Rule was not pertinent to the certification issue, it 
followed that there was no need to determine whether the Rule was 
valid, and thus no need to construe the Enabling Act’s prohibition on 
abridging substantive law.  Consequently, she did not discuss the 
point.190 
It would have been better had the Justices conducted this debate 
over uniform federal rules versus state legislative prerogatives explicitly 
in policy terms rather than through the proxy of “settled law.”191  The 
 
See id. at 418–20. 
 183  See id. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 184  See id. at 439.  Justice Stevens also adopted the “narrow construction” principle 
but did not agree that it made Rule 23 inapplicable.  See id. at 422–23 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (discussing the need to engage in a “savings” construction of the Federal 
Rule to avoid a conflict with state law). 
 185  Professor Sherry makes a similar argument.  See infra notes 191–192 and 
accompanying text. 
 186  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 187  See id. at 438 (describing how Federal Rule 23 did not apply to the issue before 
the Court). 
 188  Id. at 437. 
 189  Id. at 446 (“The Court, I am convinced, finds conflict where none is 
necessary.”). 
 190  Justice Ginsburg discussed the nature of the rights created by the New York 
penalty statute, but only to show that the statute created a rule of decision under Erie, 
not a substantive right under the Enabling Act.  The Rules of Decision Act and the 
Enabling Act work with different definitions of “substantive” law.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 191  This is Professor Sherry’s view, since she sees the Enabling Act as a subset of the 
Erie doctrine, and the Erie doctrine as policy more than law: 
[I]t is the Erie doctrine, not the [Enabling Act], that controls the decision of 
whether a particular state rule prevails over a conflicting federal one . . . 
[and] Erie . . . is quite explicitly tailored to protecting the substantive law and 
policies of individual states and thus allows federal law to operate in some 
CONDLIN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  11:30 AM 
32 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1 
law was not “settled,” for one thing, and getting sidetracked on the 
issue of whether it was, prevented a thorough examination of the 
policies at play in the case.  It is not clear, for example, that 
accommodating state legislative prerogatives poses any greater threat 
to the uniform application of the Federal Rules than does the 
existence of different local rules from one federal judicial district to 
another.192  Justice Scalia’s portentous warning about the 
“disembowel[ment]”193 of the federal judicial system might have been 
hyperbole for effect more than an accurate prediction of the 
consequences of adopting a two-part view of the Enabling Act validity 
standard.194 
Similarly, a system of uniform Federal Rules might pose little or 
no threat to state legislative prerogatives.  It may not be possible to 
 
states but not others. . . . Under my proposal, the Court would instead have 
to decide explicitly whether the federal interest in uniform, transsubstantive 
procedural rules for federal courts is more important than allowing states to 
make substantive policy choices.  
Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why the Court Can’t Fix the Erie Doctrine, 10 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 173, 178, 193 (2013). 
 192  Professor Rosenberg has characterized federal court local rules as a “procedural 
[t]ower of Babel.”  See Hearings on S. 915 and H. A 6111 Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Improvements to Judicial Machinery, 90th Cong. 282 (1967) (testimony of Professor 
Maurice Rosenberg).  See also Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: 
Usurpation, Legislation, or Information, 14 LOY. L. REV. 213 (1981); Robert Keeton, The 
Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 853 (1989); 
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and States Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and 
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989).  Professor Sherry points to 
another example of how the Rules are not applied uniformly in all cases.  As she 
explains, the Supreme Court’s insistence that the Federal Rules are transsubstantive 
does not comport with the Court’s different application of them in different types of 
cases, depending upon the content of state law.  See also Sherry, supra note 191, at 193 
n.93.  Allstate’s brief in Shady Grove identified other state laws that might create a 
conflict with Federal Rules similar to that created by the New York penalty statute.  See 
also infra note 196.  On the importance of uniformity in federal procedural rules 
generally, see also Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of 
Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001). 
 193  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416 (majority opinion) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–
74). 
 194  Bauer, supra note 18, at 965 (“[T]he assertion that federal courts would 
encounter chaos in an absence of complete uniformity of procedural rules seems 
overwrought.”).  See also Burbank & Wolff: 
[W]e believe that the application of a Federal Rule may vary not according 
to the putative policies underlying state law on the same matter, but rather 
according to the structure and operation of state law as it interacts with and 
is implemented by the litigation process.  Because schemes of substantive 
rights are not uniform, the respect for such schemes that the Enabling Act 
enjoins may require just such differential application. 
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 46–47. 
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write Federal Rules in the language of “practice and procedure” 
required by the Enabling Act that have more than an incidental or 
insubstantial effect on state substantive rights.195  Language simply may 
not be that flexible.  Whether these and other such concerns are real, 
however, are empirical questions that needed to be answered by the 
Court on the basis of actual evidence rather than thought experiments, 
ideological commitments, and axiomatic pronouncements.  The 
Justices needed at least a rough empirical sense of how often the 
Federal Rules were likely to conflict with state substantive law before 
they could answer the questions.196  To have this sense, first they needed 
to define the Enabling Act’s conception of “substantive rights.”197  Even 
dismissing subsection (b) of the Act as redundant required an 
understanding of what it said. 
Shady Grove was the first Supreme Court decision to raise the “one-
or-two-part validity standard” issue explicitly and discuss it in those 
terms.  It did this presumably to resolve the issue, but when the dust 
had settled, the meaning of the Enabling Act was more uncertain than 
ever.  In a little over seven decades, the Court had reduced a majority 
view (“really regulates procedure”) to a plurality one, introduced a 
middle ground position (“balance” federal and state interests),198 and 
failed to subject the policy considerations that underlay the competing 
interpretations of the Act to careful empirical testing.  This is not 
exactly a loaves-and-fishes level of performance. 
 
 195  See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 48 (“Many, if not most, of the Federal 
Rules are charters for discretionary decision making, setting boundaries and leaving 
the actual choices to federal trial judges.  To that extent, they are only superficially 
uniform and superficially transsubstantive.  The uniformity at which the Enabling Act 
aims must be measured in pragmatic terms, neither fatally undermined by an 
approach that focuses on policies underlying state law on the same issue, nor 
cemented by jingoistic dogma heedless of the evolving realities of court rulemaking 
and litigation practice . . . .”). 
 196  Justice Scalia suggested that there would be “hundreds” of such instances, but 
then changed that estimate to “countless” later in the same sentence.  See Shady Grove, 
559 U.S. at 415.  See also id. at 451 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing 
“numerous state statutory provisions” that could conflict with Federal Rules); Brief for 
Respondent at App’x A, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009 WL 2777648 (Allstate brief listing 96 examples of state 
laws that could conflict with Federal Rules). 
 197  See generally Ely, supra note 47, at 733–37 (describing different ways to define 
“substantive rights” in the Enabling Act); Burbank, supra note 34, at 1122–25 
(describing Congress’s conception of substantive rights in enacting the statute). 
 198  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418–21 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the balance 
of federal and state interests interpretation of the Enabling Act). 
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IV.  DISABLING THE ENABLING ACT 
In the period leading up to the passage of the Enabling Act, 
federal courts sitting in diversity applied federal substantive law and 
state procedural rules under the combined commands of Swift v. Tyson 
and the Conformity Act of 1872.199  This order of things was reversed 
after the decision in Erie, the passage of the Enabling Act, and the 
promulgation of the Federal Rules, so that diversity courts now applied 
state substantive law and federal procedural rules.  This about-face 
forced the courts to consider both the federalism and separation of 
powers dimensions of the Enabling Act.200  Separation of powers 
sentiments drove the passage of the Act and shaped Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissent in Sibbach,201 but the Sibbach majority did not 
discuss the Act’s federalism dimension for an understandable reason: 
the parties did not ask it to.202  The Hanna and Burlington Northern cases 
raised federalism issues—each involved a direct collision between state 
and federal law—but the Court avoided the issue in each instance by 
finding that the differences between the state and federal rules were 
not substantial enough to amount to an abridgement of the rights 
created by the state law, whatever their nature.  It was not until the 
Justices interpreted the Enabling Act from the incommensurable 
federalism and separation of powers perspectives of Justices Ginsburg 
and Scalia203 in Shady Grove, that the Court had to harmonize the two 
dimensions of the Act; but unfortunately, it was not ready to do so. 
The principles of separation of powers and federalism have long 
 
 199  Conformity Act, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872), repealed by Rules 
Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1–2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2012)); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 200  See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 37 (describing how Sibbach had become 
“out of step with legal developments”).  The early twentieth century also saw a major 
extension of federal substantive law making power into areas previously regulated by 
the states.  In this context, a federal statute prohibiting federal procedural rules from 
“abridging, enlarging or modifying substantive rights” inevitably would have been 
heard as reassurance to the states, not just Congress, that federal courts would not 
invalidate legislative enactments under the guise of making procedural rules.  See 
Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 66–76 (describing the “broad statutory purposes 
and policies undoubtedly underlying the legislation enacted in 1934”). 
 201  This was not surprising, since Sibbach presented a genuine separation of powers 
problem. 
 202  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).  As the majority 
saw it, the case also did not raise a conflict between state and federal law.  See Sibbach, 
312 U.S. at 14 (application of the Federal Rule does not result in an invasion of the 
state right to be free from personal restraint). 
 203  Scalia attributed the separation of powers rendering of the Act to Sibbach.  See 
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411–14 (majority opinion). 
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histories in American jurisprudence.204  Each defines a fundamental 
feature of the American constitutional system and each evokes strong 
emotional and intellectual loyalties.  Ordinarily, the two principles 
work in tandem, each governing a different aspect of the division of 
labor between courts and legislatures and the division of sovereignty 
between state and federal governments.  Usually, it is possible to give 
full effect to one without compromising the other, but sometimes the 
principles can collide, as they seemed to in Shady Grove.  When this 
happens, Justices reasoning sincerely and impeccably from 
incompatible starting points can speak past one another as if they were 
the only ones in the room.  This reconfiguration of the Enabling Act 
debate into a conflict between not only different understandings of 
statutory language, but also between different constitutional 
principles, hardened the competing viewpoints in dispute and made 
agreement on a single interpretation of the Act less likely.205 
Present day jurisprudential fashion has added an additional layer 
of complication to the problem.  Since Sibbach, analysis of the Enabling 
Act has been based on competing assumptions about the proper 
 
 204  Those histories are not static.  For example, the conventional understanding of 
Federalism, which saw the several states as autonomous laboratories designed to 
“promote[] choice, foster[] competition, facilitate[] participation, enable[] 
experimentation, and ward[] off a national Leviathan” in political and legislative 
matters is now challenged by a new “nationalist” Federalism, in which the states are 
seen as the national government’s agents for “improving national politics, knitting 
together the national polity, improving national policymaking, and entrenching 
national power and national policies.”  Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New 
Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1890, 1891, 1894 (2014).  
 205  The Enabling Act’s text is a major source of this problem.  The “practice and 
procedure” requirement in section (a) instructs the Supreme Court to stay within the 
limits of its constitutional authority when making Federal Rules (separation of 
powers), while the prohibition on abridging substantive rights in section (b) instructs 
it to respect the prerogatives of legislative actors (federalism).  See Redish & Murashko, 
supra note 21, at 27–28 (“The principal reason why construction of the Rules Enabling 
Act has eluded anything approaching consensus lies in the two key sections of the 
Act. . . .  The question is, how should the two sections be construed when taken 
together?”).  Congress may not have intended to include both types of instructions in 
the Act, but it included them nonetheless, and courts ordinarily have an obligation to 
give effect to all of a law’s text, not just the parts that were intended, or the parts the 
courts prefer.  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 403.  As Justice Scalia might have put it, a 
court’s job is to enforce law, not intentions, and law is what a legislature enacted, not 
what it intended to enact.  He repeated this familiar mantra in Shady Grove in discussing 
the New York penalty statute.  See id. (“[A] [l]egislature’s purpose . . . cannot override 
the statute’s clear text . . . .  The manner in which the law ‘could have been written, . . . 
has no bearing; what matters is the law the legislature did enact.  We cannot rewrite 
that to reflect our perception of legislative purpose.”).  Oddly, however, he did not 
take his own advice in parsing the Enabling Act.  See Shady Grove, 449 U.S. at 412 
(majority opinion) (Scalia acknowledging “there is something to” the point that he is 
ignoring statutory text). 
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approach to statutory interpretation, though rarely has this factor been 
discussed explicitly or been made an independent basis of the 
decisions in individual cases.206  That also changed in Shady Grove, 
where the Justices’ commitments to conflicting theories of 
interpretation were an express reason the Court was unable to agree 
on anything but the outcome.207  Justice Scalia derived the meaning of 
the Act exclusively from (some of) its language and the interpretations 
given that language over the years.  He ignored arguments based on 
statutory purpose, legislative intention, interpretive presumptions, and 
practical effects, and defended his “single criterion” interpretation of 
the Act as “unmistakably” correct, while dismissing the competing 
interpretations of Justices Ginsburg and Stevens as clearly rejected by 
the case law, or as “not so.”208  When he relied on non-textualist 
considerations to support his argument—as he did in invoking the 
policy of federal procedural uniformity—he couched those 
considerations in textualist rather than policy terms, as an argument 
for “settled law” rather than the superiority of one policy interest over 
another.209  In a sense, he justified his interpretation of the Act much 
like a “Tiger” parent210 telling a child why she had to take squash 
lessons: “Because I said so.” 
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, read the Act in light of its 
purposes, the real-world effects produced by one interpretation or the 
other, and presumptions about the proper role of separation of powers 
and federalism concerns.211  He started from the federalism premise 
 
 206  Professors Redish and Murashko provide a comprehensive and fair description 
of the presently popular theories of statutory interpretation.  See Redish & Murashko, 
supra note 21, at 42–55.  See also Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 53 (“Shady Grove is 
important because the way the Court interprets ambiguous state statutes will affect 
outcomes . . . .”); Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 57–66 (describing “The 
Relevance of Statutory Interpretation Theory in Interpreting the Rules Enabling Act”).  
 207  Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 57–66. 
 208  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 (“Hanna unmistakably expressed the same 
understanding . . . .”); id. at 411 n.9 (“There could not be a clearer rejection of the 
theory the concurrence now advocates.”); id. at 399 (“Allstate suggests that eligibility 
must depend on the particular cause of action asserted . . . [b]ut that is not so.”). 
 209  See id. at 412–13. 
 210  AMY CHUA, THE BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER 4 (2011) (explaining how 
a “working class” white father can be a “Chinese Tiger mother”).  See also Amy Chua, 
Why Chinese Mothers Are Superior, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704111504576059713528698754 
(describing why a “Tiger” parent tells a child what to do, rather than explains why she 
should do it: “Chinese parents believe that they know what is best for their children 
and therefore override all of their children’s own desires and preferences”). 
 211  This approach, say Redish and Murashko, asks how “a reasonable observer who 
is familiar with the socio-political or economic problem that the statute was designed 
to deal with or respond to would understand how the disputed statutory provision 
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that “a federal rule [is not valid under the Act if it] would displace a 
state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so 
intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the 
scope of the state-created right.”212  Reading the Act to authorize such 
a Rule, he said, would not show sufficient “sensitivity to important state 
interests . . . and regulatory policies.”213  In addition, he did not agree 
with Justice Scalia’s assertion that the sole question to be asked under 
the Act is “whether [a Federal Rule] regulates ‘the manner and the 
means’ by which the litigants’ rights are enforced.”214  This reading of 
the Act, he argued, out-textualizing Justice Scalia, “ignores the second 
limitation” in the Act’s text—that the Federal Rules “not abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right . . . and in so doing ignores the 
balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal 
procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its own rights and 
remedies.”215  Both separation-of-powers and federalism presumptions, 
he said, “counsel against judicially created rules displacing state 
substantive law.”216 
Each Justice’s approach to statutory interpretation respects the 
intentions of legislative actors, but each works with a different 
conception of legislative intent and a different understanding of how 
it is learned.  For Justice Scalia––and textualists generally––legislative 
intent is intent at the time of enactment, found exclusively in the 
ordinary meaning of language, and, once expressed, is static and 
timeless.  For Justices Stevens and Ginsburg217––and purposivists 
 
would apply to the specific factual situation before the court.”  Redish & Murashko, 
supra note 21, at 52.  They describe the approach as “an island of common sense amidst 
various interpretive approaches that ask judges to do either too much (determining 
actual intentions of those enacting a particular statute) or too little (interpreting words 
in a vacuum).”  Id. at 55.  
 212  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).  He gave statutes of 
limitations, burden of proof rules, and rules for reviewing damages on appeal, as 
examples of federal procedural rules that could displace a State’s formulation of its 
substantive law.  Id. at 425 n.9.  
 213  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 424 (citations omitted). 
 214  Id. (citation omitted). 
 215  Id. at 424–25 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  
 216  Id. at 425. 
 217  Justice Ginsburg probably would have interpreted the Enabling Act in much 
the same manner as Stevens had it been necessary for her to do so, but given her 
conclusion that Rule 23 was not pertinent to the class certification issue, she did not 
need to determine if the Rule was valid under the Enabling Act.  Consequently, she 
did not need to consider whether the New York statute created substantive rights 
under section (b) of the Act, and if it did, whether Rule 23 abridged them.  She did 
consider the question of whether the New York statute created a substantive right 
under the Rules of Decision Act, because she thought Erie required the application of 
the New York statute in federal court, and her general approach to statutory 
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generally––legislative intent is intent at the time of interpretation, 
found in the evidence of legislators’ states of mind and the purposes 
reasonably attributable to enactments, and once expressed, is open-
ended and malleable, capable of being adapted to changing 
circumstances and conditions.218  Textualists are concerned that judges 
left free to speculate about legislative intent will substitute their 
personal preferences for those of democratically elected 
representatives, while purposivists are concerned that judges not free 
to speculate about such states of mind will fail to make the adjustments 
to new or changed social conditions that legislators would make were 
they in a position to do so.219  Each view has a downside, of course, 
obtuseness in the case of textualism, and arrogance in the case of 
purposivism,220 and unfortunately, there is no objectively correct way to 
choose between the two.  Debates over theories of interpretation (in 
all fields, not just law) are as longstanding and intractable as any 
 
interpretation is evident in her analysis of the New York statute.  But it is not possible 
to deduce her understanding of the Enabling Act by extrapolating from this analysis 
since the Enabling Act and Decision Act work with different definitions of substantive 
law.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–66 (1965). 
 218  Justice Scalia recognized that the meaning of a Rule’s text can change over time, 
but only when the meaning of the language in question has changed.  See Semtek Int’l 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501–02 (2001) (acknowledging that “the 
meaning of the term ‘judgment on the merits’ [as used in Federal Rule 41(b)] has 
gradually undergone change” over the years and “has come to be applied to some 
judgments . . . that do not pass upon the substantive merits of a claim and hence do 
not . . . entail claim-preclusive effect”) (citation omitted). 
 219  Judge Richard Posner is the most articulate proponent of this “faithful agent” 
view.  See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“The judge should try to think his way 
as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would 
have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”); see also Roosevelt, supra note 18, 
at 53 (“Scalia’s rather wooden textualism does not make much sense when trying to 
determine how a statute should operate in contexts the lawmakers did not 
contemplate.”). 
 220  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 31 (“[T]he lack of a textually inevitable 
interpretation [of the Enabling Act] likely explains why the last seventy years of 
doctrine and scholarship have failed to produce a generally accepted construction of 
the procedural-substantive interplay in the Act’s two key provisions.”).  This 
“inevitability” notwithstanding, Professors Redish and Murashko do not give up on the 
possibility of convincing others to see things their way.  They argue that “the Rules 
Enabling Act serves as a quintessential illustration of a statute whose ambiguous text 
must be interpreted in light of objectively determined background purposes, rather 
than via a narrow focus on either the literal meaning of the text or the specifics of 
legislative history.”  Id. at 32.  They describe an “incidental-effects interpretive model” 
that “does a far better job than the others of recognizing and implementing the 
purposive DNA of the Rules Enabling Act.”  Id. at 57–58.  In this respect, their take on 
the Enabling Act debate is similar to a common theme in Irish nationalist music—”it’s 
not over.”  
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debates in the realm of ideas generally.221  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Justices talked past one another at the epistemological and 
theoretical levels in Shady Grove, as well as the literal one. 
Scholarly commentary on the Enabling Act provides little help in 
resolving these difficulties.  Academic commentators have proposed a 
wide array of solutions to the Enabling Act interpretation problem over 
the years––and continue to do so––but none of these proposals has 
commanded the assent of other academic commentators or a majority 
of the Court.  To use only recent examples, Professor Burbank argues 
that the Court should interpret the Act in terms of its original 
separation-of-powers purposes and neutralize the adverse federalism 
effects of such an approach by using federal common law and a 
dynamic approach to statutory interpretation to prevent intrusions by 
Federal Rules into the domain of state substantive lawmaking.222  
Professors Redish and Murashko dismiss this approach as a “house of 
cards,”223 and argue instead for a refined version of the “incidental 
effects” test used in Hanna and Burlington Northern to enforce the “two 
broad purposes motivating the Act’s framers.”224  This, they contend, 
would “avoid[] all the problems caused by the narrow and 
counterproductive attempt to discern the actual intent of the enacting 
 
 221  See SCALIA, supra note 45, at 23 (“American courts have no intelligible, generally 
accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”) (quoting 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)).  Theories of interpretation typically focus on 
language (textualism), actual legislator intent (intentionalism), reasonable legislator 
intent (purposivism), practical effects (consequentialism), or all of the above 
(dynamism), though most actual theories combine these elements in varying 
proportions to create hybrid views with different emphases.  Theories of interpretation 
cycle in and out of influence on a regular basis.  Every theory has had its day in the 
spotlight, usually when a well-known proponent, either academic or judicial, has 
achieved a high level of prominence, only to fade to black as its deficiencies become 
clearer with use, or its proponents lose influence. 
 222  See Burbank, supra note 34, at 1114.  Professors Redish and Murashko take issue 
with this approach.  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 83 (“Burbank’s . . . 
standard . . . . has the effect of seriously restricting the rulemakers’ powers to enforce 
the rules’ procedural directives.  When Burbank has his standard recognize safety 
valves, it does so on the basis of completely imagined or rationally dubious factors.”). 
 223  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 83 (“If one carefully examines the 
historical basis and practical implications of Burbank’s . . . standard, it is revealed for 
the house of cards that it is.”). 
 224  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 87.  Professors Redish and Murashko 
trace the “incidental effects” test to the Burlington Northern decision, but the Court 
articulated this test first in Hanna twenty years earlier.  See id. at 86 n.308 (“Although 
both Murphree and Hanna mention the phrase ‘incidental effects’—the latter doing so 
only by citing Murphree—in neither decision has the Court gone through the trouble 
of explaining how the incidental effects test relates to broad purposes underlying the 
Enabling Act.”).  
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Congress by instead seeking only to facilitate objectively determined 
background purposes motivating the Act.”225  Professor Sherry rejects 
both of these approaches as a “pox on both your houses,” and argues 
instead for an approach that interprets the Enabling Act, in light of 
the Erie Doctrine, to require a balancing of federal and state interests 
to determine the validity of a Federal Rule.226  Like Justice Ginsburg, 
she sees the Act as an expression of policy more than law, and would 
make judges rather than legislators its principal authors.  The variety 
and incompatibility of these different approaches to interpretation—
intentionalist, purposivist, and dynamic227—make it clear that, if 
anything, academics are more divided than members of the Court on 
how to proceed. 
In light of these difficulties, it seems unrealistic to expect the 
controversy over the Enabling Act’s validity standard to be resolved 
anytime soon.  It has been more than seventy years since Sibbach was 
decided and a consensus interpretation has yet to be reached.228  An 
 
 225  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 84. 
 226  See Sherry, supra note 191, at 190–91.  There is a perhaps unintended irony in 
Professor Sherry’s “Erie Doctrine” argument.  The controlling law in Erie was the Rules 
of Decision Act, not a court-created legal doctrine.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938) (describing how the Court reinterpreted the Rules of Decision 
Act to require the application of state substantive law).  To think otherwise is to see 
the decision as grounded on a “brooding omnipresence of reason in the sky,” the very 
conception of law Erie repudiated in overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  
Professor Ely pointed out many years ago that Erie is the name of a case, not a doctrine, 
but many continue to miss the force of this point.  See Condlin, Formstone, supra note 2, 
at 509–11 (describing the reluctance of some academic commentators to accept the 
idea that the decision in Erie was based on the Rules of Decision Act).  If Erie was a 
doctrine, and the Enabling Act incorporated it, one still would not balance federal and 
state interests to determine the validity of a Federal Rule.  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) is the only support for a balancing test in the Erie line 
of cases, but the Supreme Court repudiated Byrd’s balancing in Hanna.  See Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965).  See also Condlin, Formstone, supra note 2, at 516–
17 (describing the Hanna decision’s rejection of the Byrd balancing test). 
 227  There are many more.  See supra note 18. 
 228  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 27 (“To this day, no real consensus has 
developed as to how the Act should be interpreted.”).  The Court’s impasse on this 
issue may reflect a larger difficulty it has with procedural rules generally.  It is not clear, 
for example, why the Court took certiorari in Shady Grove if it was not ready to decide 
whether section (b) of the Act had independent content.  That was the only difficult 
issue in the case.  No one doubted that Rule 23 was a rule of practice and procedure.  
Yet, having taken the case, the Court could not resolve the issue.  Something similar 
happened in the McIntyre case in the 2011 term, where the Court granted certiorari 
seemingly to resolve a longstanding controversy over the nature of the purposefulness 
requirement in the “stream of commerce” subset of personal jurisdiction doctrine, 
only to find when it came time for a decision that no view commanded five votes.  See 
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).  It is unusual to see the Court 
make two mistaken grants of certiorari in the same area of law, so close in time.  
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impasse of this magnitude and duration is not likely to be broken by a 
new analytical insight, innovative argument, or surprise research 
discovery229 making one point of view demonstrably correct and the 
others demonstrably false.  Able and highly regarded Justices and 
scholars have tried all of those strategies and the impasse remains.  
Political alliances on the Court could change, of course, and a majority 
for one or another view could emerge.230  But if that was going to 
happen it also probably would have happened before now.  Seventy 
years is long enough for every point of view to rise to the surface and 
every political coalition to form.  The disagreements in Enabling Act 
jurisprudence are philosophical and political more than linguistic and 
interpretive, and there is no overarching philosophical or political 
framework into which the competing perspectives can be converted, 
or any set of reconciliatory principles through which the perspectives 
can be combined and synthesized. 
The short of it then, is that argument over the Enabling Act, at 
least in the Act’s present form, is likely to continue indefinitely into 
the future, oscillating between incompatible sovereignty principles 
and competing theories of interpretation in a debate no one can win 
(or lose).  Like debates over the meaning of due process, commerce, 
religion, and other fundamental constitutional principles, debate over 
the Enabling Act’s substance/procedure distinction is shaped by 
mutually exclusive intellectual commitments that make common 
ground more, rather than less, difficult to find.  In the absence of a 
framework for reconciling or selecting among the competing views, 
therefore, muddling through is about all that is left.231  But muddling 
through suspends Enabling Act interpretation in mid-air, effectively 
disabling the Act in litigation involving disagreements over the 
application of the Federal Rules, and forcing litigants to guess whether 
 
 229  These possibilities are only improbable, not out of the question.  Compare the 
fortuitous discovery by Charles Warren, described in Erie, of a previously unknown 
draft of the Rules of Decision Act allegedly indicating that the Act intended to include 
state decisional law as well as state statutes in the phrase “rules of decision”; or the 
equally fortuitous discovery by Wilford Woodruff, President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, that the Lord approved of the Church’s compliance with 
the Morrill Act (prohibiting polygamy).  B. CARMON HARDY, SOLEMN COVENANT: THE 
MORMON POLYGAMOUS PASSAGE 130 (1992) (describing Woodruff’s discovery); Charles 
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 
86 (1923) (describing a previously unknown draft of the Rules of Decision Act). 
 230  Professors Burbank and Farhang describe the importance of politics in 
Enabling Act analysis.  See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation 
Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). 
 231  Justice Scalia was content with this option.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 414–15 (“[W]e have managed to muddle through 
well enough in the 69 years since Sibbach was decided . . . .”). 
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the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon 
predictable ritual, judicial power grab, or law-based judgment.  Will the 
Rule automatically be found valid, as Justice Harlan famously 
predicted in his “arguably procedural, ergo constitutional” sarcasm (as 
Justice Scalia preferred),232 will it be construed narrowly in light of tacit 
federalism principles, to be taken out of play on pertinence grounds 
whenever it threatens state legislative prerogatives (as Justice Ginsburg 
prefers),233 or will it be tested against an actual substance/procedure 
standard everyone can agree on (as Justice Stevens preferred)? The 
first two of these possibilities promote cynicism about the rule of law, 
and the third looks as if it never will be tried.234 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps a little surprising that after all these years the 
Supreme Court has not been able to agree on the standard for 
determining the validity of a Federal Rule.  Even a blind squirrel is 
reputed to discover an acorn now and then.235  The central logjam in 
this interpretive odyssey—deciding whether the Enabling Act standard 
 
 232  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).  While wrong 
about the source of the standard (a Federal Rule is tested against the Enabling Act, 
not the Constitution), Harlan’s phrase has proved to be a reasonably accurate 
paraphrase of Sibbach’s “really regulates procedure” standard for determining the 
validity of a Federal Rule. 
 233  See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 18, at 37 (“[S]ince Walker, the Justices have 
lurched from one extreme to the other, giving some Federal Rules a scope of 
application broader than appears plausible—certainly, broader than necessary to 
escape a charge of infidelity to the text—while emptying others of content.”).  
 234  See Redish & Murashko, supra note 21, at 41 (describing the effects on federal 
court rulemaking of the inability to reach a consensus interpretation of the Enabling 
Act). 
 235  See CHARLES CLAY DOYLE ET AL., THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN PROVERBS 238–39 
(Charles Clay Doyle & Wolfgang Mieder eds., 2012) (surmising that the squirrel and 
acorn version of this familiar proverb is a twist on an earlier version involving a pig and 
acorn).  See also MARTIN H. MANSER, THE FACTS ON FILE DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 74 
(2007) (“Even a blind pig occasionally picks up an acorn.”); A DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN PROVERBS 464 (Wolfgang Mieder et al. eds., 1992) (“Even a blind pig 
occasionally picks up an acorn” from Colo., Ill., Ky.); JON R. STONE, THE ROUTLEDGE 
BOOK OF WORLD PROVERBS 40 (2007) (“Even a blind pig finds an acorn now and then” 
from Russian); RICHARD M. DORSON, BUYING THE WIND: REGIONAL FOLKLORE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 141 (1972) (“Even a blind pig will sometimes find an acorn.”) (quoting 
EDWIN MILLER FOGEL, PROVERBS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA GERMANS (1929)) (translating 
the saying from Pa. German and High German).  There also is a pig and truffle version 
of the proverb but it makes less sense.  Pigs (more accurately, “truffle hogs”), find 
truffles by smelling and rooting them out with their noses, and being blind would not 
prevent them from doing this.  See Walter Sullivan, Truffles: Why Pigs Can Sniff Them 
Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/24/garden/truffles-why-pigs-can-sniff-them-
out.html. 
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has one or two parts—seems simple enough to break, but the Court’s 
efforts in that regard have been relentlessly unsuccessful.  Sibbach 
reduced the standard to a single “practice and procedure” 
requirement and ignored the Act’s prohibition on abridging 
substantive rights.  Hanna recognized the prohibition on abridging 
substantive rights as an independent part of the standard, but 
discussed only the concept of “abridgement” and ignored that of 
“substantive rights.”  Burlington Northern also recognized the substantive 
rights prohibition as an independent part of the standard, but rewrote 
it, to include a “substantiality” requirement and, like Hanna, failed to 
say anything about the concept of substantive rights itself.  The Court 
has not found it difficult to apply the standard over the years.  The next 
time it finds a Federal Rule invalid will be the first time.  But it has 
decided Enabling Act cases in such analytically different ways that 
agreement on outcome is about the only thing the cases have in 
common.  Not until Shady Grove did the Court confront the question 
of whether the Act articulates a “one- or two-part validity standard,” but 
then having done so, it could not muster a majority for one or the 
other answer.  Perhaps it is time for Congress to act, this time to “really 
regulate procedure.” 
